Following Afghanistan's Footsteps: Al-Qaeda Proposes a Project Beyond "Military Force" in Mali

In a remarkable shift in the course of the conflict within Mali, the group "Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen" linked to Al-Qaeda, revealed the outlines of a comprehensive political project, based not only on military force, but also on a local structure, flexible alliances, and a cumulative strategy that, according to analysts, places it on a path similar to the Taliban model.

This announcement comes after a recent statement in which the organization explicitly called for the overthrow of the military council and the launch of a transitional phase culminating in the establishment of a system based on Sharia law, in what is considered the first clear expression of a political ambition that transcends armed action.

However, this transformation is based on a clear hierarchical path, starting from the local social base upon which the organization relies.

Unlike many transnational organizations, "Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen" relies primarily on Malian fighters, especially from the Fulani, Tuareg, and Arabs, which has given it the ability to penetrate the social fabric, deal with local disputes such as land, grazing, and protection, and build influence that transcends the ideological dimension.

This local foundation was strengthened early on through the integration of Al-Qaeda branches in the region into a unified framework since 2017, when several groups merged, most notably "Ansar Dine," "Al-Mourabitoun," and "Katibat Macina."

Experts believe that this merger was not merely an organizational step, but rather a strategic strength, as it spared the organization from internal conflicts that exhausted other groups, and granted it cohesion and dominance over the jihadist scene in the Sahel.

At the heart of this system, "Katibat Macina," led by Amadou Koufa, stands out as a striking arm of the organization, especially in central Mali, where it relies on a broad popular base of the Fulani, and is responsible for a large part of the operations, making it a key tool in expanding influence towards the south and the vicinity of the capital, Bamako.

With the consolidation of this military and social weight, the organization moved to a higher level of pragmatism by allying with Azawadi movements, despite ideological differences.

International reports, including "Reuters," spoke of field coordination between "Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen" and the "Azawad Liberation Front," especially in battles in the north and around Bamako, in a step reflecting a redefinition of the conflict based on intersecting interests and a common enemy, rather than ideological affiliation.

This progression – from a local base, to organizational unity, to a striking force, and then to flexible alliances – paved the way for what analysts describe as the organization's "political transformation."

Instead of seeking direct and rapid control over power, it works to exhaust the state, manage areas of influence, and impose local governance patterns, resembling a "shadow authority" that gradually expands.

Experts warn that this path bears clear features of the Taliban experience, which began as a local movement and then transformed into a political force capable of imposing itself through negotiation or de facto control, benefiting from the weakness of the central state.

Analysts say that the danger of the ongoing model in Mali lies in the fact that the organization presents itself not only as an armed opposition force, but also as a potential political alternative, seeking to enter any future settlement from a position of strength, after having established its presence militarily and socially.

Amid increasing pressure on the military council in Bamako, observers believe that the announcement of this project places the country before a new phase, where the challenge is no longer limited to confronting an armed insurgency, but extends to containing a project that redefines the rules of governance themselves.

Analysts conclude that what is happening in the Sahel may represent a broader strategic shift, in which Al-Qaeda-linked groups transition from merely a military actor to a political player seeking to re-engineer power, relying on a mix of force, pragmatism, and alliances, in a model gradually approaching experiences seen in other parts of the world.