Lebanon
Trump's campaign against drugs in Latin America faces a new challenge in Colombia, where changing leadership alone won't dismantle the deep-rooted cocaine trade network.

The battle waged by U.S. President Donald Trump against drugs in Latin America no longer stops at ousting left-wing governments and pushing right-wing allies into power. His project in Colombia now faces a more complex test: merely replacing the president is insufficient to dry up one of the largest sources of cocaine flowing into the United States.
This reality has become evident with the rise to power in Colombia of Trump’s ally and right-wing candidate Gustavo Petro, following an election campaign that placed restoring security and waging war on drugs at the top of its priorities, while sharply criticizing the previous leftist president, Gustavo Petro, accusing him of either laxity in confronting drug cartels or failure to contain their expansion.
Experts speaking to "Al-Araby" note that simply changing political leadership in Bogotá may not be enough to reverse the cocaine equation, given the intricate web intertwining drug cultivation, armed gangs, economic interests, and cross-border networks.
"Security through force"
Dr. Hassan al-Zein, researcher on South American affairs, argues that the arrival of a new president reopens the debate around the theory of "security through force," a strategy that aligns with Trump’s vision for Latin America. However, implementing it in Colombia runs into deep political and security complexities.
Al-Zein told "Al-Araby" that the Colombian opposition does not operate from a single center but is fragmented across multiple forces and orientations, making engagement more difficult and placing the new government before divergent fronts.
He pointed to the expanding reach of cocaine cultivation in the country over recent years, asserting that the scale of the phenomenon makes confrontation far greater than a mere political change at the top, especially considering the massive U.S. funding poured into its security strategy to combat drugs.
According to al-Zein, the United States views Colombia alongside Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico as nations capable of shifting the balance of power in Latin America, making developments in Bogotá part of a broader regional struggle between right and left.
He added that Trump is leading an effort to restore the right to prominence in the Latin American landscape and build a more Washington-aligned political base, which makes it difficult to separate changes in Colombia from ongoing political struggles in Brazil or developments in Venezuela and Cuba.
Will cocaine trafficking end?
Despite the new administration’s tough rhetoric, al-Zein doubts a rapid and fundamental shift in cocaine cultivation and trafficking will occur, arguing that the economy tied to drugs has long surpassed the boundaries of traditional cartels.
He contends that networks linked to this trade have extensions beyond Colombia, mentioning interactions with influential figures within American society and raising allegations about connections involving individuals linked to U.S. agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
No independent evidence has been provided by the expert to substantiate these claims, but according to his analysis, they reflect the extent of entanglement that makes eradicating the cocaine trade far more complex than simply changing governments or launching large-scale security campaigns.
Voting for punishment
Meanwhile, Ali Farhat, expert on Latin American relations, argues that the political landscape in South America is not governed by fixed popular rules favoring either the right or the left. He explains that voters tend to hold current governments accountable and give new faces a chance when administrations fail to deliver on promises.
Farhat told "Al-Araby" that De la Espriella benefited from the shortcomings that marked Petro’s tenure, even though the latter achieved success in addressing some internal issues. Nevertheless, Petro’s project collided with a political and sovereign structure unfamiliar to Colombia.
According to Farhat, Washington treated Petro’s experience as a threat to its traditional influence in a country historically tied to close security, political, and diplomatic ties with the United States. Thus, it exerted political, economic, and security pressures to counter his direction.
But the dilemma facing the right, according to the expert, lies in the social dimension: broad sectors of Latin American populations favor programs focused on health, education, and improving living standards. A retreat from these issues could reopen the door for the left.
Nothing will change much
Farhat questions whether the new political shift can bring about a genuine breakthrough in the drug trade, arguing that the link between the rise of the left and the expansion of cocaine trafficking was, in part, used as a tool in the political conflict with Petro’s government.
He notes that cocaine trafficking has remained active during both right-wing and left-wing rule alike, meaning that a conservative administration coming to power does not automatically imply a decline in production and smuggling operations.
He expects the most significant change in the coming phase will be the expanded scope of U.S. intervention in Colombia’s domestic affairs—politically and militarily—under the banner of "drug enforcement."
Thus, Trump finds himself facing a difficult paradox: his ally succeeded in reaching power in one of Latin America’s most important countries, but the real battle begins after the ballots are counted, where the roots of the cocaine economy run far deeper than the presidential palace in Bogotá.



