Hezbollah's Refusal to Hand Over Ali al-Taher Draws 'Vitavat' to Lebanon

Between the fires of the south, the fog of Rome, and closed Security Council chambers, Lebanon stands at a crossroads that could define the next phase: will diplomacy contain the battlefield, or will the latter impose its terms at the negotiating table? Israeli escalation and Hezbollah's intransigence have turned the Ali al-Taher heights into a knot encapsulating issues of arms, withdrawal, deployment of the Lebanese army, and halting military operations—all while the new round of talks in Rome continues in September, awaiting Washington’s confirmation of its timing.

In this context, information from "Nidaa al-Watan" revealed that efforts led by President Joseph Aoun, coordinated with Speaker Nabih Berri who has now entered the Ali al-Taher file, to convince Hezbollah to withdraw from the ridge and hand it over to the Lebanese Army, have so far yielded no results.

Accordingly, sources argue that Hezbollah’s continued passivity and lack of cooperation with the Lebanese state foreshadow a gradual Israeli escalation that may not stop at Ali al-Taher, but could extend its fire toward Jabal al-Riyan and Sajd, if the impasse remains unresolved.

The sources added that the Israeli side is no longer willing to offer additional concessions as long as, in its view, the Lebanese state has not yet taken concrete and serious steps toward disarming Hezbollah. This places Beirut in a more difficult phase, where American pressures intersect with Israeli threats and state attempts to prevent the ground situation from spiraling into a wider confrontation.

On the ground, Israeli escalation in the south is accelerating, with ongoing military operations expanding in scope. In this context, Israeli army spokesperson Ila Wawaya announced via the "X" platform that "the combat group under the Golan Brigade continues operations in the security zone in southern Lebanon to eliminate threats," noting that "in recent weeks, forces destroyed over 400 terrorist infrastructures and seized various combat equipment, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, improvised explosive devices, weapons, and mortar shells."

This military deadlock directly impacts the diplomatic track, as sources explain the absence of a final date for the upcoming Rome talks, as well as the failure to agree on a verification committee and new model zones.

Parallel to these military and diplomatic knots, attention turns to the closed consultations the United Nations Security Council is holding on Lebanon, at France’s request—Lebanon’s lead country on the file—during a session focusing on what comes after UNIFIL.

In Beirut, anxiety prevails within the Lebanese state that the time available before UNIFIL’s departure will be insufficient to develop an alternative framework and ensure a smooth transition to new security arrangements in the south. As is now known, Tel Aviv supports the creation of a European-international replacement force, but insists it must have clear and effective mandates, playing a direct role in advancing Hezbollah’s disarmament. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and, behind it, Iran prefer a model closer to the UNIFIL precedent—a limited international presence with restricted authority and impact.

Yet the room for finding a middle ground appears narrow, given a decisive U.S. veto rejecting any reenactment of the previous UNIFIL experience, whether through a new mandate extension or a replacement force maintaining the same approach. According to American sources cited by "Nidaa al-Watan," even the latest international force mandate was undermined by the Lebanese state’s inability to fully exercise control over its territory—specifically, the promised deployment of around 15,000 army personnel was not completed, and, according to these sources, requests for UNIFIL assistance to secure borders were absent. As a result, no real partnership emerged between the Lebanese Army and the international force, leaving the south an open arena for consolidating Hezbollah’s influence.

As international efforts focus on the post-UNIFIL phase, the role of the Lebanese Army remains the cornerstone of any future arrangement. In this regard, President Joseph Aoun briefed Army Commander General Rudolph Hikkel on the overall security situation in the country and particularly in the south, amid ongoing Israeli attacks on southern villages and towns. Hikkel also updated President Aoun on the outcomes of his visit to Italy and discussions held with Italian officials.

Hikkel’s visit to Baabda carries added significance ahead of the conference France, in coordination with Jordan, will host on September 17 to support the Lebanese Army, as international bets grow on strengthening its capabilities, enabling expanded deployment, and assuming broader responsibilities. However, according to an informed source, the outcome of the upcoming conference hinges on the state’s ability to present tangible models proving that bolstering the army is matched by actual expansion of its authority on the ground.

It is from here that the issue of Ali al-Taher resurfaces once again. If the state succeeds in convincing Hezbollah to hand over the site to the army, Lebanon will head to Paris with a practical card to present to donors. But if Ali al-Taher remains outside the reach of state authority—represented on the ground by the Lebanese Army—and if, simultaneously, agreement on model zones and verification mechanisms stalls, Lebanon may face the reverse question: why increase support for the army if the state remains unable to empower it to enforce its authority in areas where it should assume security responsibility?

"Nidaa al-Watan"