The "Deadly" Bet: How Nasrallah Miscalculated the Day After October 7

Hezbollah did not know that the October 7, 2023, attack would occur that morning, and its leadership, according to information obtained by "Erem News" from Lebanese security and political sources, was not previously informed of its timing or magnitude. However, in less than 24 hours, the party had taken one of the most costly decisions in its history; opening a front in southern Lebanon to support the Gaza Strip.

The information reveals, for the first time, an aspect of the discussion preceding the start of operations on October 8, the estimates upon which the decision was built, leading up to the internal reviews that followed the war, which are today re-examining hypotheses that seemed calculated to the leadership at the time, before leading to a confrontation that ended with the loss of a large part of the party's leadership and military ranks.

Nasrallah's Decision

Sources say that the decision to open the front was taken by former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, in consultation with a very narrow military and organizational circle, whose most prominent members were Fuad Shukr and Hashem Safieddine.

According to the sources, the decision was ratified within the party's institutions based on the principle of "unity of fronts," while the Iranian Quds Force was informed of the step and related arrangements without waiting for operational permission from Tehran. Iran blessed the move, according to sources, but stressed from the outset the need to control the level of escalation and prevent it from turning into an open regional war.

The party did not witness objection to the principle of supporting Gaza, but the debate revolved around the extent of the support. Sources say that voices in political and organizational circles feared the economic repercussions on Lebanon, and pushed for symbolic and geographically limited operations in Shebaa Farms, allowing for showing military solidarity with Gaza without dismantling the rules of engagement established since 2006. But the military vision prevailed in the end, turning the operations into daily clashes that gradually extended along the border.

A Three-Month War

The most important aspect of the sources' narrative relates to the time estimate that governed the decision. The party's leadership did not base its calculations on a war lasting a year or more, but on a confrontation in Gaza ranging between one and three months, measured against previous wars and rounds.

The second hypothesis was that Israel, emerging from the shock of October 7, would not want to bear a two-front war, and that deploying large Israeli forces in the north and evacuating residents of border settlements would constitute additional pressure pushing Tel Aviv towards ending the Gaza war.

Facts show that the Lebanese front indeed drained Israeli military resources. In February 2024, the Israeli army announced the deployment of three military divisions on the northern front, parallel to thousands of strikes carried out against Hezbollah targets.

But the political result came opposite to the party's initial estimate; the northern front did not push Israel to end the Gaza war, but rather gradually turned into an independent war of attrition.

The Opportunity That Was Not Seized

Here, sources place what they consider the most costly decision; namely, refusing to separate the Lebanese front from Gaza when settlement opportunities began to appear during 2024.
US envoy Amos Hochstein, along with French moves, carried ideas for de-escalation, implementing Resolution 1701, and security arrangements on the border, with support and development projects for the south. In March 2024, then-Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati confirmed the existence of a proposal conveyed by Hochstein, which Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri was studying.

But Hezbollah stuck to its equation stating that there would be no cessation of the Lebanese front before stopping the war in Gaza. According to sources, what appeared at the time as a pressure card later turned into a strategic constraint; as the timing of closing the Lebanese front became linked to negotiations over which the party had no control.

Shukr.. The Alarm Bell

Sources identify the assassination of Fuad Shukr in Beirut's southern suburbs in July 2024 as the moment when true realization began inside the leadership that Israel was no longer operating according to old rules of engagement. Hezbollah confirmed at the time that Shukr was killed in the Israeli airstrike.

After that, the confrontation entered a different phase that ended with the assassination of Nasrallah and the striking of a large number of party leaders. Those operations, according to investigations published by Reuters, revealed the extent of Israeli intelligence penetration of the leadership structure and communications within the party.

Sources say that the reviews conducted by the current leadership headed by Naim Qassem no longer limit themselves to evaluating military operations, but look into older structural flaws, such as the party's expansion and long involvement in the Syrian war, the increase in the number of its cadres and their areas of movement, and the decline in the security discipline that characterized its secret structure previously.

Investigations focus particularly on the penetration of communication systems leading to pager and walkie-talkie explosions, and on how Israel managed to build a target bank that included highly sensitive leadership and military levels.

"Erem News"