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World
A Foreign Policy analysis argues that Xi Jinping's system deliberately prevents any single figure from amassing independent power, even among his closest aides.
The debate over who holds the position of "second-in-command" in China is misleading, according to a new analysis from *Foreign Policy*. The magazine argues that President Xi Jinping's strategy is built on preventing any independent power center from emerging within the Communist Party, even among his most trusted associates.
The analysis points to the rise of official Cai Qi in recent years. Many observers have viewed him as the second most influential figure after Xi, given his expanding role within the president's inner circle and his frequent appearances alongside Xi at sensitive meetings and events. However, the report suggests this impression is partially deceptive. Cai's proximity to Xi does not translate into independent authority or the ability to form a parallel power base within the state and party, which are designed to be highly centralized precisely to prevent any potential political heir from emerging.
Cai Qi holds a series of sensitive posts within the Communist Party, including membership on the Politburo Standing Committee, head of the party's General Office, and director of its Secretariat. These positions grant him direct influence over Xi Jinping's agenda, official documents, intelligence, meetings, and security arrangements. This role has led some Western analyses to portray him as the president's "political gatekeeper," reminiscent of figures close to emperors in Chinese history who controlled access to the ruler and influenced decision-making.
Yet the *Foreign Policy* report clarifies that this historical comparison is imprecise. Cai does not monopolize channels of communication to the president. He lacks an independent apparatus of influence within the party, state, or military. The military, national security agencies, party discipline bodies, economic administration, and party organization all maintain direct lines of communication with Xi Jinping, preventing any single official from hoarding access to the center of power.
The power Cai Qi wields is fundamentally tied to his ability to execute Xi Jinping's will, not to forge an independent political agenda. He oversees coordination, follow-up, and the transmission of directives within party organs and monitors the implementation of top leadership instructions. However, the analysis finds no clear indicators that he can reorder political priorities or impose his own direction within the system. Highly centralized systems often grant close associates broad influence, but that influence remains contingent on the leader's presence, not the independence of the institution they lead. Cai's importance rises as Xi's own role in governing the state and party strengthens, but it does not transform into independent authority capable of surviving without him.
In contrast, the report argues that Premier Li Qiang retains the broader executive weight within the Chinese system, despite the increasing centralization of power in Xi's hands. The analysis notes that "the organizational rules within the Communist Party grant Li Qiang a pivotal role in managing the state during the president's absence, including following up on government and economic files and ensuring the continuity of governance institutions."
Li also outranks Cai on several of the most sensitive central committees, particularly the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. This body has been one of the most important platforms for economic decision-making in China since the era of reform and opening up. The report highlights that "the way official meetings within the party are managed also reflects this balance; in major meetings dominated by Xi Jinping, Li Qiang often chairs the sessions or delivers closing remarks, while Cai Qi's role is limited to attendance and follow-up."
Managing economic portfolios gives Li Qiang a political weight that is practically difficult to bypass within the Chinese system. Issues related to local debt, the real estate sector, consumption stimulus, industrial policies, foreign investment, unemployment, and the operation of local governments all fall within the scope of the government administration he leads. *Foreign Policy* sees these files as representing the most sensitive challenges for the Chinese state, making Li Qiang's responsibility heavier than the organizational role Cai plays within the party apparatus. The report also notes that real influence within the party is not solely linked to proximity to the president, but to the ability to control appointments and promotions within the party structure—powers that are not entirely in Cai Qi's hands.
The analysis concludes that Xi Jinping's era has reshaped the concept of leadership within the Communist Party by dismantling the traditional idea of a "second man," which existed to varying degrees in earlier stages of Chinese rule. Instead of allowing a strong figure with comprehensive influence to emerge under the president's leadership, Xi has adopted a model that distributes power among several competing figures and institutions, while keeping the final decision centralized with himself.
This model gives Xi greater control over the political system and prevents any potential internal threat from forming. However, it also makes the governance structure more dependent on the president's person than on the traditional institutions of the state and party. In this context, Cai Qi's elevated status appears to be a reflection of his extreme closeness to Xi Jinping, not evidence of a real "second man" in contemporary China. The *Foreign Policy* analysis states that "what most characterizes Xi's system today is not the rise of a new figure to the rank of second man, but the disappearance of this position from the Chinese power structure altogether."
