Security Report Reveals 'Critical Gaps' in Israel's Readiness

Published by what is known as the "October Council," a civil organization representing families of those killed and injured in the October 7, 2023 attack and including security experts, the report warns of seven indicators regarding Israel's security readiness, signaling the possibility of a repeat of the Hamas attack.

The report, published by "Walla," highlights warnings about manpower shortages, Hamas's ongoing efforts to test Israeli military responses in areas designated as the "yellow line," where Israeli military control ends and Gaza-controlled zones begin.

The report's authors stated they "observed real gaps and risks in Israel's security readiness after nearly three years since the attack, including recurring patterns and policies that existed before the war and have not disappeared."

They emphasized that this document is not intended to replace an official investigation, nor does it aim to assign criminal or professional responsibility to relevant bodies. Instead, its purpose is to gather information, investigations, and field testimonies, and to raise warning signs and questions requiring immediate, systematic, and independent examination.

Deterrence Concept

The report's authors believe this is the first warning sign, as Israel's policy before October 7 was based on the assumption that Hamas was subdued and could be managed through force, deterrence, concessions, and quiet.

The report notes that "Hamas was deterred after the war without being dismantled, and the threat is now being managed again through settlements, the 'yellow line' mechanism, future disarmament, international forces, and political mechanisms that have not yet proven effective in practically dismantling the group on the ground."

The report states: "Hamas has not been disarmed; it continues recruiting members, manufacturing weapons, rehabilitating itself, and rebuilding its governance structures."

It adds: "If Hamas is given time, money, and space to reorganize while Israel convinces itself the situation is under control, it will create the false perception that sets the stage for another attack."

Watchdog Recruits

The report points to a troubling similarity between warnings issued by watchdog recruits prior to October 7 and current testimonies emerging from the Gaza front.

It states: "Before the October 7 attack, watchdog recruits observed training activities, continuous approaches toward the fence, and behavioral changes within Hamas, but this information was not translated at the time into a comprehensive systemic warning."

It adds: "In August, new testimonies from watchdog recruits were published, describing Hamas elements testing Israeli military responses, along with their feeling that operational approvals and response times were delayed in certain cases."

According to the report, one watchdog recruit working in the Gaza Strip said Hamas repeatedly sends elements to test Israeli responses, crossing the "yellow line" or roaming the area to assess how quickly the army would respond—or whether it would respond at all.

New Defensive Line

According to the report, the third warning relates to Hamas activity around the "yellow line," with documented operations crossing this line, proximity to Israeli forces, ground movements, explosive device placement, and intelligence gathering having been recorded over several months.

A leaked internal Israeli military report from August revealed documentation of 14 breaches within just 24 hours, with 11 classified as advanced and severe threats to military operations.

The report quotes a soldier from a special unit serving in Gaza: "We see them on surveillance screens standing on the yellow line testing us. Hamas operatives work in lands adjacent to the line, digging and burying things there, while frontline units are not authorized to respond or target them."

The report notes that nearly years of continuous fighting have not eliminated Hamas as a military and ruling force. The authors refer to strategic assessments published within the security establishment, indicating that the movement still possesses tens of thousands of active members, many of whom are newly recruited.

The report states: "Hamas continues producing weapons, repairing infrastructure, collecting funds, paying salaries, and activating its administrative authority. Meanwhile, tunnels continue to be discovered, while public political discourse focuses on issues of sector reconstruction and future disarmament."

Human Drain

One of the central warning signals in the report concerns the size of available forces. According to the October Council, the Israeli military faces a heavy and ongoing burden on its reserve system, and plans to reduce service days have eroded due to real-world field demands.

Reserve soldiers who shared their testimonies describe a noticeable decline in troop numbers and extreme difficulty in covering multiple military missions.

The report adds: "In recent months, plans to reduce reserve forces supporting border town defense lines have resurfaced, but any reduction in available troops requires extremely rigorous scrutiny."

Barrier of Fear

According to the report's authors, one of the persistent problems identified across dozens of interviews is not related to intelligence or troop deployment, but rather to the ability of individuals and officials within the system to issue warnings.

Soldiers, civilians, reservists, security officers, and political figures agreed on describing existing fears and gaps—but many insisted on remaining anonymous.

Reasons cited include fear of military leaders' reactions, concern for professional careers, impact on budgets, political costs, or harm to their children.

The report warns that if someone who sees the danger still fears speaking today, "we are talking about a security failure in itself."

As quoted in the report, an Israeli official said: "Fear of speaking starts at the top and extends down to the most sensitive and senior positions. Security agencies that warned about the erosion of deterrence power were silenced."

Investigation into the Attack

The report's authors note that the Israeli military conducted an internal investigation, as did the internal security agency "Shin Bet," the police investigated events and sites, the National Security Council carried out an inquiry, and the State Comptroller examined various issues.

However, according to them, no independent, non-affiliated body has yet examined the entire chain—political level, security institution, intelligence, decision-making process, force-building, budgets, and coordination and interaction among different agencies.

The report includes testimony from a former senior official in one of the most sensitive positions within the security establishment, stating: "Netanyahu received more than ten clear warnings about the October 7 attack, but nothing moved him; he claimed we were exaggerating our assessments."

Another official in the Israeli security system says: "The decision to focus on the Iranian front wasted billions of shekels on unrealistic and fictional projects, while Hamas was growing stronger in Gaza and did not receive the adequate attention commensurate with its threat level."