Drug Crimes in Lebanon's Amnesty Law: Who Benefits?

Lebanon's General Amnesty Law did not open the door to a blanket dismissal of prosecutions and sentences for drug crimes, nor did it close that door for all perpetrators. The law established specific exceptions, and Decision No. 12 issued by the Constitutional Council on October 12, 2026, settled fundamental issues in their interpretation, removing ambiguities that could have led to inconsistent application across different cases.

The significance of this decision lies in its going beyond merely confirming general rules; it annulled two phrases related to the date of crime commission, provided a binding interpretation of the concept of recidivism, and confirmed that the exemption for military personnel and security institution members also covers crimes of cultivating narcotic substances. These amendments practically define the scope of eligibility for amnesty and prevent its expansion beyond the limits set by the law.

Recidivism is not proven merely by prosecution
Paragraph Five of Article Two stipulated that perpetrators of repeat felony drug offenses exceeding the second instance are ineligible for amnesty, regardless of whether judicial rulings were issued in these cases or not. However, the wording raised a legal issue: Is it sufficient for authorities to have prosecuted an individual more than once to consider them a repeat offender, or does it require meeting the conditions of recidivism as defined by the Penal Code?

The Constitutional Council resolved this matter by adopting the legal meaning of recidivism as defined by the Penal Code. It clarified in its reasoning that recidivism, in its legal sense, is only established by a final prior judgment, and prosecution alone is insufficient to prove it.

This distinction is not a procedural detail. Prosecution means the person underwent judicial proceedings, but it does not necessarily mean guilt was proven by a final verdict. Therefore, multiple prosecutions cannot be treated as automatic evidence of recidivism that prevents eligibility for amnesty.

Thus, the application of the exception becomes linked to the legal conditions for recidivism, not merely the number of files or prosecutions recorded against the individual. This necessitates examining each case individually and verifying the conditions required by law before excluding the perpetrator from amnesty.

Security exemption includes cultivation?
The law exempted all drug crimes committed by military personnel and members of security institutions. However, the following paragraph stated that crimes of cultivating narcotic substances are covered by amnesty if committed before the law's issuance. The juxtaposition of these texts created ambiguity regarding the status of a soldier or security member who commits a cultivation crime.

Should cultivation be treated specially to allow amnesty coverage, or does the perpetrator remain exempt due to their professional status?

The Constitutional Council adopted the latter interpretation, deciding that the exemption for all drug crimes committed by military personnel and security institution members also includes crimes of cultivating narcotic substances committed by them. Consequently, the paragraph specifically addressing cultivation cannot be used to bypass the exemption for this category.

This means the perpetrator's status remains a decisive factor in this case. A ruling that might allow cultivation crimes to be covered by amnesty does not extend to military personnel and security members included in the exemption, even when the crime is cultivation rather than trafficking or possession.

Here appears the function of the interpretive reservation adopted by the Council: removing apparent conflicts between paragraphs and determining the binding reading that authorities and judicial references must adopt.

The definitive time limit
One of the most significant issues settled by the decision was the date upon which crimes eligible for amnesty are measured. The original text linked certain provisions regarding recidivism and cultivation to the date of the law's issuance, which could have led to differential treatment based on the issuance date rather than a unified reference point.

The Constitutional Council annulled the phrase "and committed before the issuance of this law" in Paragraph Two of Item Five of Article Two, as well as the phrase "if committed before the issuance of this law" in Paragraph Three of the same item. It affirmed that March 1, 2026, is the unified temporal limit for all crimes eligible for amnesty, including drug crimes and their cultivation.

This amendment was not merely formal. The Council viewed that linking eligibility to the law's issuance date could include acts committed after March 1, 2026, i.e., after the public debate began or after voting, thereby violating equality among perpetrators of similar crimes and potentially turning amnesty into an incentive to commit crimes during the period preceding its approval.

Accordingly, it is not enough for the crime to be of a type that could be covered by amnesty; it must also have been committed within the approved timeframe. This condition applies to drug crimes and cultivation, as well as other crimes covered by the law, subject to its specified exceptions.

No blanket amnesty, no unconditional exemption
The handling of drug crimes shows that the Constitutional Council's decision did not abolish the balance the law attempted to strike between granting amnesty within specific limits and exempting certain crimes or categories. Instead, it made this balance clearer by linking recidivism to its legal definition, confirming that the exemption for military and security personnel covers cultivation crimes, and unifying the cutoff date at March 1, 2026.

The result is that eligibility for amnesty is not determined simply by describing a crime as drug-related, nor by the mere multiplicity of prosecutions. It requires careful examination of the nature of the act, the status of the perpetrator, the extent to which recidivism is met according to the law, and the date of the crime.

Practically, competent judicial bodies will apply these rules when reviewing each file, without expanding exceptions or narrowing the scope of amnesty contrary to the text and binding interpretation. In this framework, the decision does not establish a new rule for drug crime amnesty so much as it precisely defines the boundaries within which it may be applied, preventing divergent jurisprudence on matters explicitly settled by the Constitutional Council.

"Al-Nashra"