Attempted Murder Excluded from General Amnesty: Judicial Precedent in Mount Lebanon Upholds Right to Life

In a judicial precedent worthy of attention, the Indictment Chamber in Mount Lebanon established a highly significant legal principle: the felony of intentional attempted murder, whether premeditated or not, remains excluded from the provisions of the General Amnesty Law, just like completed murder.

The decision was issued by the Mount Lebanon Indictment Chamber on 5/11/2026, presided over by Judge Fadi Al-Aridi and composed of Counselors Marji Majdalani and Cécile Sarhal. The ruling distinguished itself through deep legal reasoning in interpreting the scope of exceptions within General Amnesty Law No. 70/2026.
The decision started from the premise that general amnesty applies to the crime itself rather than the perpetrator, and that determining the extent to which a crime is covered by amnesty lies in its correct legal description, not in the outcome of the criminal act. One who attempts to take a human life and possesses the necessary criminal intent for murder does not differ, in terms of criminal intent, from one who commits completed murder, merely because the result—the taking of life—did not materialize due to reasons beyond their control.
In this context, the Chamber considered that attempted murder constitutes a stage in the commission of the same felony, and that excluding intentional homicide crimes from general amnesty cannot be interpreted in a way that includes the completed crime but excludes its attempt, as such an interpretation would lead to a result contrary to the purpose of the exception and the philosophy of criminal protection established by the legislator for the right to life.
The reasoning did not limit itself to literal interpretation of the text but also relied on constitutional principles, particularly the protection of the right to life and physical integrity, the rule of law, victims' rights to redress, and society's interest in preventing impunity. The decision invoked the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council regarding the purpose and limits of general amnesty laws, confirming that the interpretation of legal texts should ensure consistency with principles of constitutional value.
The significance of this precedent lies in its affirmation that the incompleteness of a crime does not necessarily mean the disappearance of its danger or its eligibility for amnesty, and that the difference between murder and attempted murder relates to the realization of the criminal result, not the nature of the criminal intent accompanying the act.

What distinguishes this decision is not only the outcome it reached but the legal methodology adopted in interpreting amnesty provisions, placing the protection of the right to life, victims' rights, and the rule of law at the core of judicial interpretation.
This reflects the importance of the role played by the judiciary in applying legal texts in harmony with their purposes and principles of justice.