War Deepens Within the Russian System: Why Isn’t Putin Retreating Despite the Cost?

War in Ukraine is inflicting increasing damage on Russia, from Ukrainian strikes inside Russian territory raising civilian casualties, to disruptions in e-commerce and fuel shortages, all the way to an economy facing low growth and high inflation.

In May, Russian banker Andrei Klyapach said Russia "is falling behind" and losing out in global technological and economic competition, even "losing it to Ukraine." In August, he was fired from the state development bank where he worked due to his remarks.

Yet these pressures do not appear sufficient to push Russian President Vladimir Putin into changing course. After more than four and a half years of war, Russia has failed to turn its massive military sacrifices into decisive gains—but Putin faces no real political threat in return, according to Foreign Affairs.

Thus, expecting Russian concessions or a negotiated settlement in the near or medium term seems far from reality under the constraints imposed by the Russian system.

The System Endures War

The war that Putin launched in 2022 was not separate from the nature of the system he built over more than two decades. Since coming to power in 2000, he gradually tightened control over the state, media, and business sectors, weakened regional powers and political parties, and forced major businessmen to abandon political ambitions.

By 2012, when he was elected president for the third time, he had consolidated extensive influence across the three sectors. After 2022, remaining independent media outlets and hundreds of thousands of anti-war citizens fled abroad, while those who stayed faced persecution.

Before the parliamentary elections starting September 18, the Kremlin barred the anti-war party Yabloko from participating, and anti-war politician Lev Shlosberg was sentenced to 11 years in prison. Thus, the absence of genuine opposition has become part of the status quo.

Putin did not limit himself to consolidating political control—he also militarized the state and society. He heavily invested in defense, made commemorating victory in World War II a core element of national identity, and encouraged the militarization of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia under Putin waged wars and military operations in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria.

Over time, war became familiar to Russians, while the Kremlin successfully framed it as an inevitable necessity due to Russia’s enemies—and as a demonstration of Russia’s strength and status as a great power.

Even the 2023 revolt led by Yevgeny Prigozhin did not turn into a revolution and ended with his death. Meanwhile, opinion polls show increasing Russian preference for peace talks, and business owners and workers feel frustrated by rising taxes. But these cracks remain limited.

Puvin Does Not See Defeat

Putin’s project rests on subjugating Ukraine and forcing the West to accept this outcome. In July, addressing naval troops, he stated: "Ukraine will lose its western territories, sooner or later." This reflects his continued view of Russia as a power capable of imposing its terms—not as a country seeking a settlement.

Putin does not face an obvious lack of military options; the Russian army possesses significant manpower for a war of attrition, and the country has substantial production capacity for missiles and drones. Domestically, Russians lack effective political tools to express their discontent.

Ukrainian strikes inside Russian territory may instead serve as an additional source of nationalist sentiment and defensive support—especially among Russians hostile to the West. The Kremlin can also frame the continuation of war as proof of Russia’s independence and ability to resist American and European pressure.

War Without End

The authors argue that Putinism and war have become so intertwined that they are now difficult to disentangle. Even if the economy faces further difficulties or public discontent grows, Putin remains capable of using state institutions, security apparatuses, and economic resources to sustain the war.

Moreover, despite its heavy reliance on Putin personally, the system possesses elements that could endure beyond his departure—organized opposition would require the ability to confront the vast security apparatuses Putin entrenched over years of rule.

For the United States and Europe, the key issue lies in recognizing that Putin is prepared to continue the war for years. The war has become part of Putinism, and Putinism has become deeply rooted in the war—making both elements inseparable components of how Russia governs itself and views its place in the world.