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Culture & Society
Arab nations are experiencing a swift drop in fertility rates, raising concerns about aging populations and future economic impacts.
Egyptians may recall the 1980s song "Hasanein wa Mohamedin," which became iconic in one of the largest family planning campaigns in the Arab world’s most populous country. This campaign was followed by others featuring various artists and public figures.
Slogans such as "A man is not only by his word, but by his care for his home and family" and "Support is not in numbers, two are enough" were part of later campaigns. However, family planning efforts in the region actually began earlier, with policies dating back to the early 1960s.
During childhood, many heard media and intellectual elites link Western progress to lower population numbers and the consequent better care for citizens, while highlighting China’s economic struggles due to its large population.
These messages, both explicit and implicit, conveyed that overpopulation was the root of problems such as economic decline, stalled development, inadequate services, and rising unemployment.
No one at the time explained that a country’s progress does not depend solely on population size, nor does a large population necessarily cause underdevelopment. Instead, the decisive factors are often economic and educational policies and governments’ ability to transform human resources into productive forces.
This perspective was not unique to the Arab world but extended to many developing countries influenced by demographic theories linking economic growth to reduced birth rates.
International organizations and donors played a significant role in supporting family planning programs, based on the belief that lowering birth rates would help governments improve health and education services and ease economic pressures.
These ideas gained traction amid insufficient government development efforts to keep pace with population growth, which led to rising unemployment and increased challenges related to housing and public services. Consequently, family planning awareness campaigns spread unevenly across countries.
Unexpectedly, some societies experienced fertility rates declining faster than anticipated, turning concerns from high birth rates to low birth rates within a few decades. Economic crises made marriage and childbirth increasingly unaffordable luxuries.
As these generations matured, Western countries began to face population shortages and aging demographics due to low birth rates and longer life expectancies.
China, which had implemented a one-child policy in 1978, reversed it at the end of 2015 to allow two children per family. Despite this, population numbers have been declining since 2022, prompting experts to warn of a severe demographic downturn unlikely to be reversed soon.
Similar trends affect Japan and South Korea, two of China’s major neighboring economies, both struggling with shrinking workforces.
Europe, which benefited from a post-World War II baby boom, has seen a clear fertility decline since the mid-1970s alongside increased longevity due to healthcare advances. This has raised alarms about population shortages and their negative effects on economic progress.
European countries, often cited by Arab states as models for family planning, began adopting family support policies in the late 20th century. These included incentives for childbirth, raising retirement ages, pension reforms, and open immigration policies to offset workforce shortages.
At that time, many in the Arab world believed their situation was different and did not foresee facing aging populations and population decline concerns themselves.
Three years ago, experts warned that falling fertility rates had become a global crisis affecting all countries, not just developed ones. In 2021, 124 countries recorded fertility rates below two children per woman.
The Arab world is no longer exempt from these trends. Family planning efforts appear to have "succeeded too well," with increasing discussions about declining fertility, especially in North African countries.
A recent French study by the National Institute for Demographic Studies revealed shifts in the age structure of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia’s populations, warning of accelerated aging in coming decades.
The study noted that these countries underwent one of the fastest demographic transitions globally during the last third of the 20th century. Fertility rates fell from about seven children per woman in the 1970s to current levels considered "low" or "very low" due to significant changes in reproductive behavior.
In 2024, fertility rates dropped to 1.53 children per woman in Tunisia, 1.97 in Morocco, and 2.61 in Algeria, with a downward trend continuing.
This phenomenon is not limited to North Africa; other Arab countries are experiencing similar patterns at varying rates, indicating a broad demographic shift whose effects may become more apparent in future decades.
Specialists warn that if this trend persists, it could lead to rapid population aging and a shrinking working-age population, negatively impacting economic growth, productivity, and social welfare financing.
The fertility decline stems from multiple interacting economic, social, and cultural factors. Economically, rising costs of living, housing, education, and healthcare have increased the financial burden of raising children. Many young people delay marriage due to economic instability, alongside widespread contraceptive use.
Socially, higher education levels, especially among women, increased female labor force participation, and changing lifestyles and aspirations compared to previous generations have contributed.
Urbanization and city expansion have diminished the traditional large family model common in agricultural societies, where many children were considered economic and social assets.
Media and digital culture have also reshaped concepts of family, marriage, and childbearing in line with broader global changes.
The French study highlighted that continuous fertility declines have altered the age structure in the three North African countries, with Tunisia leading in aging. The proportion of people aged 60 and over rose from 8% in 1997 to 17% in 2024.
Morocco and Algeria also show high aging rates, with acceleration expected in coming decades.
A late 2024 study from the University of Sharjah warned of fertility declines across the Arab world, attributing them to economic and cultural factors as well as wars and conflicts.
Analyzing fertility data from 2011 to 2021, the study found a general decline ranging from 3.8% to 24.3%.
A 2022 report from the Gulf Center for Studies and Research noted a significant fertility drop in Kuwait, from seven children per woman in the 1960s to just two in 2021. Kuwait’s population growth rate also declined from 2.5% in 2015 to 1.8% in 2021.
In Egypt, the most populous Arab country, a United Nations Population Fund study indicated a total fertility rate decrease from 3.5 children per woman in 2014 to 2.76 in 2022. The Ministry of Health and Population reported a further decline to 2.41 in 2024.
Saudi Arabia experienced a 39.8% drop in birth rates between 2020 and 2023, while official data showed a 10% decline from 2017 to 2022.
Professor Nour Al-Alawi, a sociology expert at the University of Tunisia, told Al Jazeera that indicators show the Arab world entering an aging phase, with the population pyramid shifting from a normal shape to an inverted one, where elderly people outnumber children.
Al-Alawi believes some Arab countries may need to adopt measures similar to those taken in Iran to encourage marriage and childbirth to avoid the aging issues currently seen in Europe.
The Tunisian academic cited his country as an example where reduced birth rates have led to labor shortages.
Conversely, Egyptian expert Ayman Zuhri told Anadolu Agency that population aging is a long-term issue and current fertility declines will not have immediate effects.
Egyptian economist Ali Al-Idrisi considers the fertility decline’s current impact limited but foresees significant future consequences for the economy, growth, and labor market. He stresses the need for smart, balanced management of demographic changes.
Al-Idrisi views low fertility as a double-edged sword: on the positive side, it offers an opportunity to rebuild the economy focusing on productivity, knowledge, and technology, easing burdens on education and health services, and increasing per capita public spending.
On the negative side, if unplanned, it could lead to labor shortages, increased dependency ratios, and higher costs for pensions, insurance, and healthcare.
In late 2017, the United Nations Population Fund warned that Arab countries face a growing challenge from their increasing elderly populations, posing significant economic, social, and health challenges.
Data from the fund projects that by 2045, the number of people aged 60 or older in the region will be six times higher than in 2000.
Currently, the Arab world does not face a traditional population shortage but is approaching a new phase requiring a comprehensive reassessment of demographic policies.
The issue lies not in population growth or decline alone, but in achieving a balance that ensures a sufficient workforce to support economic development without overwhelming resources and services.
The 2025 Population Status Report highlights real challenges, noting that millions wish to have children but cannot due to economic pressures, job insecurity, and fears about the future, rather than a rejection of parenthood.
For decades, the region feared a population explosion, but current indicators open a different concern: what if Arab countries discover that the population they sought to reduce is actually what they need to sustain growth and economic vitality?
At that point, the question may shift from "How can we reduce population?" to the more complex "How can we maintain a young society capable of reproduction, work, and production?"
