After Ali al-Taher... Is Mount Al-Raihan in Israel's Sights?

The significance of Ali al-Taher does not end with the conclusion of the battles around it. The highlands in southern Lebanon are not read as isolated points, but as an interconnected web controlling observation, movement, and deployment. From this perspective, Mount Al-Raihan and the Taif region become central in any assessment of the next phase.

Mount Al-Raihan is not an ordinary location in southern geography. Its elevation and position within the range stretching between the Taif region and Jezzine grant it strategic value, making control over the area impactful beyond the mountain itself—especially regarding surveillance and control of surrounding axes.

For Israel, the importance of these highlands lies in their potential to become a forward security depth north of the border. After Shqif and Ali al-Taher, any further advance toward the Taif and Al-Raihan regions represents a shift from targeting specific sites to attempting influence over an entire chain of highlands.

This does not mean an Israeli decision has been made to move toward Al-Raihan, but including the region in calculations reveals the scale of change in the nature of the equation. Operations are no longer tied solely to borders; they are beginning to touch the internal geography of the south.

Thus, the urgency of accelerating Lebanese-Israeli negotiations becomes clear, alongside the stabilization of a ceasefire and the concentration of arms under state authority. Every delay in the political track leaves room for new military realities to be established, which may later become additional bargaining chips in Israel’s hands.

Confining weapons to state control should not be viewed merely through the lens of external demands, but as part of restoring the state’s authority over war and peace, and preventing southern Lebanon and its highlands from becoming open arenas for multiple military decisions.

If the political path remains delayed, each new strategic point could become an additional card on the negotiating table. Ali al-Taher serves as a clear example of how geography can rapidly shift from a battlefield site to a factor in the political equation.

Therefore, protecting what remains of Lebanon’s leverage is not achieved by delaying negotiations, but by accelerating the diplomatic process, reinforcing state authority, and preventing Mount Al-Raihan or any other highland from becoming a new reality imposed on Lebanon and then used against it in negotiations.

After Ali al-Taher, Al-Raihan and the Taif region have become part of the scene that must be closely monitored. The faster Lebanon moves toward a clear political settlement, the less power the field will have to impose new realities—and the decision will ultimately remain at the state’s table, not atop mountain peaks.

Saad Shaheen