New Secrets and Details About the 'Bijar' Operation: Here's the Latest Report

The Israeli website "Walla" reported on the "Bijar" operation, stating that by October 7, 2023, Mossad had produced 500 devices and delivered them to Hezbollah through an extremely complex method, leaving no trace. It noted that afterward, then-Mossad chief Dedi Cohen issued an order to accelerate production, aware that "the Day of Judgment" was approaching and that Hezbollah’s entry into war was only a matter of time.

It highlighted that the devices were assembled one by one manually under highly sensitive conditions, as it was impossible to conceal explosives inside the devices using factory equipment without triggering detection by scanning devices or leaving suspicious traces.

Under Cohen’s directive, a production and assembly line was established within Mossad’s headquarters itself, with other projects frozen and volunteer activities involving Mossad personnel from nearby settlements and farms suspended, redirecting field teams to carry out the mission.

It pointed out that shortly thereafter, a decisive logistical challenge emerged: there was no vacant building large enough to accommodate all assembly stations within the headquarters. The only option was Mossad’s sports hall, which was completely cleared of equipment. Guards heightened security measures, transforming it from a routine space into a highly sensitive security center at the heart of the facility. Mobile installations were also set up alongside it.

The newspaper revealed that the idea of embedding explosives into small alarm devices capable of being remotely detonated originated years earlier in the mind of one female technician in Mossad’s technology unit. However, the proposal was rejected due to budgetary and technological constraints—until it was revived during Cohen’s tenure.

A source familiar with the assembly process stated: "Many said it was impossible, that there was no way to do it. They claimed the explosives were too small to be effective, that the task was far too complex and would never succeed, and that it was impossible to hide a bomb inside an alarm device."

The newspaper disclosed that around 2022, one technician approached Cohen and whispered in his ear: "I did it. There is a way," and Cohen listened with intense interest, replying: "Great. Come to my office—I want to see this."

The technician, who later received Israel’s Defense Award for this work, said: "It wasn’t written down anywhere. I stayed up all night, and the idea suddenly struck me."

According to the newspaper, Cohen insisted on seeing the concept firsthand. They went to his office, where the technician sketched the entire operation on paper. The idea crystallized and became a practical reality, receiving all necessary approvals—operational and safety-related.

The newspaper explained that Mossad and Israel’s military intelligence were aware that the late Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, did not carry an alarm device with him in the shelter. Nevertheless, several of his aides and bodyguards worked in his immediate vicinity, using the devices to stay constantly updated on general operational announcements while maintaining a high level of secrecy—especially given fears of mobile phone surveillance by Israeli intelligence. The report noted that at the moment of truth, those closest to Nasrallah were hit by the explosive devices and fell dead beside him.

According to sources cited in the report, this was the closest Nasrallah had come, over nearly two decades, to feeling death surrounding him—and realizing that Israel could reach him. Moreover, he witnessed the scene with his own eyes, and the victims were not anonymous figures outside the shelter, but individuals he knew intimately.

A security source noted: "Despite the magnitude of the surprise, the shock and humiliation felt by Nasrallah and senior leaders of the organization were equally profound," adding that the event severely undermined his authority and self-confidence regarding the future.

The newspaper stated: "On the following day, the second strike was delivered, which the report claims caused significant damage to Hezbollah’s operational capabilities. The order was given, and the organization’s radio devices began exploding one after another."

According to sources in the intelligence community, "the operation’s success was substantial, as it managed to destabilize Nasrallah, disorient him, and disrupt leadership before his assassination in central Beirut."