World
European nations fear bearing the cost of geopolitical settlements negotiated without their input following the trilateral summit in Shenzhen between China, the US, and Russia.

The absence of European representatives at the trilateral summit held on Thursday in Shenzhen, China, between Chinese President Xi Jinping, US President Donald Trump, and Russian President Vladimir Putin—likened to the "Yalta Conference" held after World War II—has raised concerns among continental countries about the risk of paying for settlements crafted behind their backs, which they will nonetheless have to fund and implement.
Between the future of the war in Ukraine and the reordering of relations between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, European capitals face a question that goes beyond being absent from the picture: how can they prevent shifting from partners in crafting settlements to mere financiers?
In Yalta in 1945, Britain sat alongside the United States and the Soviet Union, while China was absent from decisions that shaped the post-World War II world, some of which directly affected its interests.
More than eight decades later, the seats have changed: China is now the host country, while Europeans remain outside the framework.
On the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, Xi met with Putin and Trump in a meeting described by the Chinese Foreign Ministry as the first of its kind in history bringing the leaders of the three countries face-to-face. Through this, they affirmed in the "Peace Declaration" their commitment to maintaining strategic stability and international security.
As China did days earlier, the Kremlin rejected comparing the meeting to a "new Yalta," with spokesperson Dmitry Peskov describing the comparison on November 16 as "exercises in political analysis unrelated to reality," stating that Moscow "does not want anyone to decide its fate on its behalf, nor will we ever seek to determine the fates of others."
The comparison indeed has limits; Europe is not a destroyed continent, and the three powers do not hold absolute authority over the world. But denying the desire to determine others' fates does not dispel anxiety about discussing their security in their absence.
Consequently, interpretations vary among those interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat regarding the reason for Europe's "omission" from the table of the Big Three: Is it the result of the "failure of the integration project," a lack of common defense capability, or an inability to leverage economic weight politically?
Europe is needed... but for what role?
"In Shenzhen, Europe is present where business is discussed and absent where strategies are debated." This phrase summarizes the disparity between economic status and political position according to political analyst Alain Jorda, founder of La Tribune des Nations and Secretary General of the Geopolitical Observatory in Geneva.
Investigative writer Jean Mouze, founder and editor-in-chief of Radio Zone, who recently returned from a visit to China, reads the format of the meeting as a deliberate choice, saying that each of the three capitals has reasons to seek "access to the European market while limiting Europe's political role."
However, he questions the feasibility of turning exclusion into a spectacle, asking: What can be built in the long term by humiliating a partner you will need tomorrow?"
He cited Ukraine as an example, noting that "Europeans can be excluded from initial discussions, only to discover later that they are needed to finance reconstruction, continue pressure on Moscow, or guarantee a ceasefire."
Mouze believes the problem lies in the fact that late return to Europeans does not compensate for early absence; their role may become limited to "supporting a ready-made settlement and bearing the consequences of rejecting this settlement, remaining necessary but under conditions they do not set themselves."
Integration: The root of weakness or the path to overcoming it?
French writer and political commentator Laurent Ozon, former member of the political bureau of the French National Front party, goes further than criticizing the meeting format, considering the absence "the outcome of fifty years of European construction."
He explained that "The European Union was built to give Europeans power, prosperity, and peace, but in my opinion, the result is that we have obtained none of these three promises."
By doing so, he preemptively rejects the argument of proponents of "deepening European integration," who would say, according to him, "We haven't integrated enough, haven't become European enough, and haven't reached sufficient unity and centrality."
He added that more integration "does not address a crisis linked to the integration process itself," and sees the alternative as "flexible cooperation that recognizes the intersection of European interests in some files and divergence in others."
Mouze, however, draws the opposite conclusion, stating that "Vladimir Putin bet on European division, but his war on Ukraine led, in my assessment, to the opposite result: it strengthened European cohesion, just as it strengthened Ukrainian national identity."
He adds: "Europe is an economic power, but translating this weight into political and strategic influence requires more cohesive defense capabilities. The paradox is that attempts to weaken it may push it toward greater unity."
Between flexible cooperation and deeper integration, the practical test remains finding a formula that gives Europeans "greater ability to define and defend their interests."
Ukraine: Who sets the terms for peace?
Jorda warns against measuring the summit's importance solely by the issuance of a final agreement, saying that "if Washington and Moscow agree on the outlines of a ceasefire or the nature of guarantees, they may present this vision later as the starting point for any negotiations." Therefore, he believes that "any bilateral meeting between Trump and Putin deserves attention equal to the trilateral meeting. Whoever enters after references are defined negotiates modifications, not establishment."
But Mouze rejects reducing Kyiv to a passive recipient, pointing to the development of its military and technological capabilities, especially drones, and its efforts with Europeans to enhance defense production and reduce reliance on American aid.
He stated that he does not believe an agreement on Ukraine can simply be imposed without Europeans, since "Europe's security is directly linked to this country's future."
Ozon places ending the war at the forefront of priorities, adding that "general European interest begins with stopping Europeans from fighting each other. I mean Europe in its broader geographical sense, not just the European Union, including Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus alongside the rest of the continent's countries."
He clarifies that "expanding the definition of Europe geographically does not eliminate conflicting interests within it; belonging to the same continent does not produce a unified perception of security. What one country sees as a guarantee, another may see as a threat to its freedom of decision."
In his reading of the causes of the war, Ozon holds NATO expansion and US policy primarily responsible for the imbalance with Moscow, arguing that the approach of Western strategic infrastructure to what he calls the "Russian vital space" contributed to pushing the crisis toward confrontation.
He invoked the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of containing escalation through mutual concessions, warning against Ukraine becoming a "permanent wound" similar to the division of the Korean Peninsula, draining Europeans and serving, in his view, US and Chinese interests.
Ozon links the possibility of settlement to listening to Moscow, saying that "diplomacy means listening to others' justifications. You cannot build a negotiation process by refusing to listen to the other side." He adds: "We are not obliged to share Moscow's justifications, but we must listen to them."
Jorda focuses on the terms of settlement, stressing that "Europeans must agree in advance with Kyiv on the commitments they are prepared to bear." He asks: "Who verifies compliance with the ceasefire? Who acts if it is violated? And under what conditions can European sanctions be lifted?" In this sense, guarantees are not an appendix to the settlement but a condition for its continuation. They are also a source of negotiating strength for Europeans, unless they leave others to define their commitments in advance.
Between the US umbrella and Chinese weight
Ozon doubts the limits of the US umbrella, believing that "the United States will not risk destroying itself to protect Kyiv or part of European territory."
He sees the crisis revealing that "US interests and Western European countries' interests are not identical," criticizing the failure of European leaderships, particularly French, to define their interests.
In contrast, Jorda rejects reducing the alliance to political rhetoric, saying that "Trump may give the impression he wants to break free from dependence on Europe, but the message heard in communications between military leaders and through NATO channels is different."
He points out that the alliance "is based on military bases, joint plans, and intelligence sharing," whose strength is also measured by their continuity.
But continued military cooperation does not exempt Europeans from building the capacity to protect their interests if Washington changes its priorities. This capacity requires a defense industry, armament, financing, and political will to bear the cost, not just declaring independence.
China is the hub... and the rest revolve around it
On the Chinese side, Jorda believes the Chinese president entered the meeting from an advanced position: "He defines the framework of the meeting and gains political capital simply by bringing the other two together."
Ozon presents a similar image, describing China as "like the wheel's hub: the fixed part in the center around which the rest revolve." He sees holding the meeting there as a symbol calling for a European review of the results, although he refrains from describing it as a "new Yalta."
But Mouze warns against equating China's centrality with its ability to produce comprehensive consensus, because "we are not facing victorious powers sitting down to divide the world, but states each facing difficulties and contradictions that limit their ability to impose what they want." He adds: "China must maintain a degree of balance if it wants to retain its international credibility. It cannot go too far in showing bias toward Russia without bearing the consequences on its other relationships."
He cites Beijing's interests in Ukraine and its concern for reconstruction, explaining that it "wants to preserve its interests regardless of the war's outcome and does not wish to take positions that might close doors in the future."
Shenzhen: Technology as power
When Mouze visited Shenzhen for the first time in 1986, it was a "relatively modern development zone," containing agricultural towns and villages and fishing communities near Hong Kong's northern border. Today, he notes, it has "transformed into a massive technology center, resembling China's Silicon Valley."
He sees that "Chinese technological progress is striking, and artificial intelligence has become one element of China's soft power and self-image."
This transformation gives the meeting location a significance beyond hosting, as competition for influence also passes through technology, industry, and control of supply chains.
Jorda warns that "a US-China understanding on semiconductors or critical minerals could change the supply conditions for European industries," while easing US sanctions on the Russian energy sector could limit the effectiveness of Western pressure. But Europe is not without tools, as "the weight of the European market gives Brussels negotiating power, provided European capitals negotiate collectively."
What is required, in his reading, is combining market weight with production capacity, by directing military procurement to reduce sensitive dependencies and negotiating collectively on access terms to the European market.
Who shapes security?
Mouze distinguishes between the interest in de-escalation and agreeing on an exit from crises, "there are interests that may push toward calm, but that does not mean a shared vision for resolving the crisis exists."
Jorda believes the summit "may provide a political boost, but translating it into a sustainable agreement requires negotiators, verification mechanisms, and a place for countries whose security is directly involved."
Ozon reads the meeting as a sign of the global center of gravity shifting toward the Pacific, saying: "When we look at this geographical shift in power, we notice that Europe falls outside this range of relationships, tensions, conflicts, and cooperation. From this perspective, our geographical position reflects our diplomatic position."
He links this to the necessity of reviewing European options, "when a project fails, rationality dictates reviewing its causes, acknowledging mistakes, and returning to more logical foundations of work, based on solid political entities and historical traditions."
Instead of more integration, he advocates cooperation as needed, because "gathering weaknesses does not create strength. What creates strength is the ability to establish effective cooperation whenever necessary." But this vision faces the test of how countries retain freedom to define their interests without allowing their diversity to enable great powers to negotiate with each capital individually and weaken their collective weight.
Slow building of European defense power
Mouze bets on defense cohesion, while Jorda highlights the difference between the speed of negotiation and the slowness of building power, saying: "The European rearmament process has begun, but converting budgets into actual capabilities takes time. Therefore, Europe cannot wait for full defense independence to influence settlements. The immediate bet is leveraging what it has in market, sanctions, and guarantee provision capabilities, parallel to building missing tools."
From Geneva, a European diplomat places the dilemma in the context of declining multilateral frameworks in favor of limited-party understandings.
The diplomatic source told Asharq Al-Awsat that "discussing global stability and peace is impossible without the United States, Russia, and China," but noted "an increasing shift toward bilateral and trilateral discussions, without involving the rest of the world."
European call to involve everyone and stick to dialogue
While urging support for the UN, he stresses the need to broaden participation: "We need to involve more parties and listen to everyone's opinions. Otherwise, sustainable peace will not be achievable."
Given Trump's fluctuating approach to China, the source is cautious about expecting a breakthrough, setting a more modest goal: "What I hope they achieve, realistically, is positive and continuous dialogue among them."
A Washington-Moscow-Beijing understanding may reduce tension, but it alone does not guarantee Europe's security. Between Yalta and Shenzhen, the change in seats is not limited to who attends and who is absent, but includes who sets the terms and who bears their cost. The European test is ensuring that its necessary contribution to implementing the settlement does not become a substitute for its participation in crafting it.



