World
"Secret Deal" to Rotate Influence: Baghdad Enters Critical Phase to Resolve "Jurf al-Sakhr" Crisis
Iraq enters a decisive phase in the Jurf al-Sakhr crisis as Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi's deadline for disarming militias expires, amid a secret deal brokered by Iran's Quds Force commander to avoid internal Shia conflict.

Iraq enters a critical phase today, Friday, in the Jurf al-Sakhr crisis, coinciding with the expiration of the deadline set by Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi for clearing the area of armed formations, and the start of a field test for a settlement mediated by Iranian Quds Force Commander Ismail Qaani, aimed at avoiding an armed confrontation that could threaten the cohesion of the ruling Shia forces.
After days of escalation and threats to use force, consultations led to understandings stipulating the redistribution of security responsibilities in this strategic area north of Babil province, by replacing units linked to Hezbollah Brigades with units from the Army, Federal Police, and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in a formula that grants the government a security foothold within the area without excluding the PMF from the control equation.
Despite the announcement of the implementation of arrangements starting Friday morning, the first hours saw conflicting reports regarding the pace of troop deployment, with local sources indicating delays in the operation's launch, keeping questions alive about the extent of the parties' commitment to the details of the agreement.
Well-informed Iraqi sources reveal to "Erem News" that the settlement crystallized in recent hours was not merely an agreement on swapping military units, but resulted from mutual fears of an explosion of confrontation within the "Shia House," after Al-Zaidi insisted on breaking the security taboos that had kept Jurf al-Sakhr outside direct government institutional control for nearly 12 years.
Doumino Fears
According to sources, Al-Zaidi chose calculated escalation against armed factions, relying on intelligence information and investigations regarding suspicions of oil smuggling and manipulation of supply lines passing through Jurf al-Sakhr, alongside his awareness of the scale of international pressures, especially American ones, aimed at regulating weapons outside state authority and securing vital facilities.
Sources clarify that what alarmed the factions was not just the possibility of losing sole control over Jurf al-Sakhr, but the fear that the step would become a precedent opening the way for similar measures in their zones of influence in the Baghdad belt and Diyala and Anbar provinces.
According to these estimates, a retreat in Jurf al-Sakhr could trigger what sources describe as the "domino effect," where the fall of one closed stronghold of influence leads to a re-evaluation of security arrangements entrenched over the past years, a scenario considered by the factions a direct threat to their military and political balance of power.
Faced with these fears, Qaani entered the crisis line, holding a series of calls and meetings with political and factional leaders, including Hezbollah Brigades Secretary-General Abu Hussein Al-Hamidaoui, Badr Organization leader Hadi Al-Ameri, and PMF Commission Chairman Falah Al-Fayadh.
Sources indicate that the primary goal of the Iranian move was to prevent the dispute from transitioning from political institutions to an armed confrontation between parties belonging to the same Shia camp, while reaching a formula that preserves the government's ability to implement decisions and allows factions to avoid losing their influence completely.
Rotating Influence
Details of the settlement, according to sources, reveal the adoption of an equation based on distancing formations linked to Hezbollah Brigades from the front line of direct security deployment, replacing them with regular forces and other formations integrated under the PMF Commission.
The arrangements stipulate assigning responsibility for specific sectors to the 72nd and 79th Brigades of the PMF, in coordination with government forces, while Energy Police take charge of protecting oil transport lines and preventing their exploitation in potential smuggling operations.
Sources view this formula as allowing Al-Zaidi to proceed with imposing new security arrangements without entering into a military confrontation with the Brigades, while granting the latter an exit that permits repositioning their elements away from sites to be taken over by new forces.
Sources do not rule out transferring some formations to other areas, including sectors on the western border, as part of a broader process of redistributing security influence.
However, this settlement, according to the same sources, does not mean dismantling the military structure of the factions or ending their ability to influence, but rather reflects a transition from direct control on the ground to more complex security arrangements, where government authorities intersect with the influence of armed powers within official institutions.
Dismantling the Closed Fortress
On the ground, the redeployment operation relies on a plan approved by the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, involving sharing responsibilities among the Army, Federal Police, PMF, and Energy Police, along with establishing a joint headquarters for command operations and overseeing the implementation of new arrangements.
Under the plan, the 38th Brigade of the Iraqi Army's 10th Division secures the western sector extending from the "Ya Hussein" berm to the Fadhiliya intersection and the boundary separating it from the Anbar Operations Command.
Meanwhile, the 17th Brigade of the Federal Police assumes responsibility for the center of Jurf al-Sakhr sub-district, from the Euphrates River in the east to the Musayyib–Fadhiliya road in the west.
In contrast, the 72nd and 79th Brigades of the PMF handle the sector extending towards the boundary separating it from the Karbala Operations Command, while Energy Police undertake the protection of pipelines and oil facilities.
Procedures include reopening roads that remained closed, particularly the road linking Musayyib to Bahbahani, the Fadhiliya intersection, and Ameriya Fallujah, reconnecting the area to its geographic surroundings after years of isolation.
The plan also includes retaining a counter-terrorism service force in the Garrison Camp, as a reserve under the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to handle emergencies, amidst fears that some field formations might object to withdrawal and replacement arrangements.
These procedures gain additional importance given the continued deprivation of large numbers of Jurf al-Sakhr residents from returning to their homes since 2014, with displaced persons representatives estimating that the number affected by displacement exceeds 140,000 people.
Leverage Card
The latest confrontation did not begin through the traditional dispute over weapons, but was ignited by government investigations into suspicions of oil smuggling from pipes passing through Jurf al-Sakhr, accompanied by allegations of unauthorized facilities for storing and processing petroleum derivatives.
According to sources, Al-Zaidi invested the results of the investigations to strengthen his political and security position, especially after the government took measures including dismissing nine officials and security and administrative leaders, and referring the suspected violations file to competent judicial authorities.
Sources believe this issue placed the Prime Minister's opponents before a difficult equation; public objection to the deployment of government forces became interpretable as defending the security status quo that allowed the alleged violations to occur.
In contrast, Hezbollah Brigades denied oil smuggling accusations and questioned the results of investigations and the government narrative regarding facilities in the area.
On this basis, the crisis is no longer limited to determining which entity is responsible for protecting Jurf al-Sakhr, but extends to the nature of the relationship between official institutions and armed factions, and the limits of authority the government can exercise within the latter's zones of influence.
Division Within the Framework
The Jurf al-Sakhr crisis revealed deep divergence within the Coordination Framework regarding the limits of confrontation with armed factions, and the extent to which ruling forces are willing to support government measures that may change existing balances of influence.
According to sources, a current emerged preferring to contain the crisis through negotiation, fearing that the use of force would lead to a Shia-Shia clash whose repercussions would be hard to control, a trend aligned with moves by Hadi Al-Ameri and other leaders who sought to bridge views and prevent escalation.
In contrast, Al-Zaidi showed readiness to proceed with his decisions as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, even with objections from influential parties within the ruling coalition, leveraging the oil investigations file and calls to restrict weapons to the state.
Sources note that Qaani's intervention reflected Tehran's awareness of the crisis's sensitivity, especially since any confrontation between the government and Hezbollah Brigades would have put Iran before a difficult test between preserving the influence of its armed allies and preventing shaking the Shia political system with which it maintains close relations.
Erem News
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