Salam: No Clash with 'Hezbollah'... And What He Said About the Goal of the Framework Agreement

Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced that "I have only two observations. In fact, I have a problem with using the term 'agreement', because this description may open the door to confusion about whether we are dealing with an agreement or not. The answer is: no, we are not dealing with an agreement. Therefore, this is called a Framework, not a Framework Agreement. And this is an important point."

He added: "I clarify this so that we all know what we are talking about. We are talking here about a framework. And what is this framework? It is a guiding framework for negotiations that defines their path. Within this same framework, a distinction is made between the goal and reaching subsequent agreements; indeed, the text, particularly in Article Twelve, indicates that there are agreements that will be concluded at a later stage."

He continued: "And this characterization is important because its legal and political effects are different. If we consider it an agreement, that means it is tantamount to a treaty, and it entails legal and security effects. As for what we are dealing with, it is a political framework, and the political framework naturally includes commitments, but they remain political commitments."

He affirmed that "our goal is the return of people to their homes. But we must first look at where we have arrived. We are not amateurs in negotiations, nor amateurs in meetings with American and Israeli officials, nor amateurs in going to Washington. Unfortunately, we have reached what we have reached as a result of two wars, not to say two adventures, and this is the truth."

He said: "The first adventure led to the fall of thousands of victims, and caused a cost exceeding seven billion dollars, before calculating the overall economic results. As for this war, its cost is expected to exceed thirteen billion dollars, in addition to the human losses, which remain the foundation. We entered the first war, or what was called the Gaza support war. And if anyone looks today at what the situation in Gaza has become, they will realize where things stand. In return, the result for Lebanon was these burdens and losses it incurred."

He added: "Then we entered a second war, or a second adventure. I warned once, twice, and three times. It was clear, given the regional situation we were living in, that there was a high probability of going to war. Therefore, I repeatedly called for reason and rationality, and for taking the measures dictated by logic and rationality. But, unfortunately, this war was imposed on us. And although Hezbollah had promised Speaker Nabih Berri that it would not engage in the war, it was dragged into this adventure and we woke up on Monday morning to the launch of 6 rockets."

He stressed that "our goal is to get out of this war and stop this bleeding. And this is the second adventure, and so far you know how much its human cost has been, first and foremost, and this is the most dangerous. Today we have nearly five thousand martyrs, and we have more than ten thousand wounded. This is its cost. We entered two consecutive wars. If only we had learned from the first war, the Gaza support war, then we found ourselves in a second war, the war to support Iran and avenge the Supreme Leader Imam Ali Khamenei. And the war that was imposed on us, this is its cost. Therefore, we must stop this bleeding, and this is what we seek through negotiations."

He added: "We have set this framework, and it is a clear framework, and whoever reads it will realize that if it is applied, it should allow for a safe and dignified return of our people to their homes from which they were displaced - whose number reached nearly 1,200,000 displaced persons - and to lead to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, just as the safe and dignified return requires the reconstruction of destroyed villages and towns. And if we can apply this framework and secure the Israeli withdrawal, there is no other path that allows their return except this course, so that they can return to their homes, and so that we can rebuild. This is our goal."

He addressed the people of the south, saying: "There are 'falsehoods' regarding the issue of non-withdrawal and repositioning, and the text of the agreement literally says 'Israel's redeployment outside Lebanese territory,' with the definite article 'the,' meaning all Lebanese territory, and this is mentioned twice."

In response to a question about whether he is reassured that the Israeli will withdraw, he said: "I am not reassured, but I am talking about what the framework agreement stipulates. We say all Lebanese territory so that we do not fall into the pitfall that befell the famous UN Security Council Resolution 242 issued in 1967. And as you know, there is an English version and a French version; one says 'Territories,' and the other says 'The Territories.' Here, the matter is clear, as the phrase 'the Lebanese territories' appeared with the definite article, and it was not mentioned once in the second paragraph, but was mentioned twice. And in the fifth paragraph, Israel speaks about itself, stating that the Government of Israel declares that it harbors no territorial ambitions in Lebanon, and this is what we want to achieve, and it is clear in the text. And there is no difference in interpretation between the phrase 'redeployment' and the phrase 'withdrawal outside Lebanese territory.' What matters to me is the result, which is that the withdrawal be outside Lebanese territory, i.e., from all Lebanese territory, and this is what we want to achieve, and it is clear in the text. So if anyone has an interpretation of the difference between the phrase 'redeployment' and the phrase 'withdrawal outside Lebanese territory,' let them come forward and present it. For me, what matters is the result. If there is a difference, the text before me says: redeployment outside Lebanese territory."

He continued: "And it is unfortunate to raise such matters. I do not want to use the word 'misinformation,' but what is happening confuses the son of the south, and suggests to him that this does not lead to withdrawal. And it is my duty towards our people in the south to explain that the matter is clear, and that what we are doing leads to Israel's withdrawal from the south."

Regarding the absence of any time limit in the framework agreement, Prime Minister Salam said: "This is a legitimate question, but what matters to me is that this constitutes a framework for defining the path of negotiations. As for the issue of withdrawal, it is clear, and it has been described as mutual and gradual, and it is implemented according to a timetable linked to this framework. We have been able, within this framework, to impose a specific withdrawal of Israel from two areas, which have been named pilot zones, and this in itself is an initial indication of the withdrawal path. As for the timetable, it will be the subject of discussion in the next round of negotiations, not the end of the negotiations."

Regarding what Speaker Berri said, that the framework agreement is ten times worse than the May 17th Agreement, he said: "We are still in the framework. The priority of our work in the subsequent round will be to set a timetable for implementing this process. We hope that everyone who says this agreement is worse than the May 17th Agreement will explain to us why it is so, because what is being said is nothing but a catchy slogan, although I do not see that."

Regarding the ceasefire, he considered that "the current text does not literally include the phrase 'ceasefire,' but it stipulates that the ceasefire was reached after multiple rounds of negotiations, and that it builds on previous agreements and understandings issued by Washington, which affirmed more than once the necessity of a ceasefire and its consolidation. Consequently, the framework agreement comes after reaching a ceasefire, and is based on it."

When asked about the phrase 'previous agreements and understandings that have proven successful,' and whether it raises ambiguity, he said: "The problem is not with the agreement, but with the belief that it must list all its references in the text. It refers to previous agreements and understandings without enumerating them, and therefore it does not explicitly mention Resolution 1701, which is a fundamental reference for us, nor does it mention the Armistice Agreement, or the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities issued in November 2024. But that does not mean they are not existing references; it is natural for any agreement not to include all references. What matters to me is that the agreement includes clear texts regarding the extension of the Lebanese state's authority over all its territory with its own forces, i.e., by the Lebanese Armed Forces, even if it does not mention the Taif Agreement by name, which remains the primary reference."

Regarding the Armistice Agreement, which former Minister Walid Jumblatt insists on adhering to, he said: "I understand the position and concerns of Mr. Walid Jumblatt, because the Armistice Agreement is a fundamental reference for many. But what remains of it today are the principles upon which it was founded. If it is to be applicable, it needs updating, because it is primarily a military agreement, and it includes field details dating back to a different historical period, such as specifying the types of forces and equipment allowed to be deployed, and the number of vehicles, tanks, and weapons, which are no longer consistent with the reality of armies and security requirements today. It also stipulated a joint Lebanese-Israeli-UN committee, which makes it, in its current form, impractical. Nevertheless, we adhere to the principles upon which it was founded," and he pointed out that the framework agreement builds on previous agreements.

In response to a question about whether the disarmament of Hezbollah, as demanded by the Israeli side, places Lebanon and Israel in the same position in facing Hezbollah, which is a partner in the government, he replied: "This is a completely wrong concept. We could have done without the last two support adventures and their catastrophic results, which some call victories, and I do not know how they can be described as such. When we look at the number of martyrs and victims, the scale of destruction, and the cost of reconstruction, the least that can be said about what happened is that it was a catastrophe, rather two consecutive catastrophes."

He added: "Our position has been firm since the adoption of the Taif Agreement, which is the call to extend the authority of the Lebanese state with its own forces over all its territory. And this is not an incidental sentence in the Taif Agreement, but one of its fundamental pillars. The Taif Agreement ended the civil war and closed a painful chapter in Lebanon's history, and it repeated this principle more than once, because it forms the basis of the Lebanese social and political contract that stopped the war and put the country on the path to restoring sovereignty and rebuilding state institutions."

He continued: "Resolution 1701 also included more than one reference to the necessity of completing the implementation of the Taif Agreement, especially regarding the extension of the Lebanese state's authority with its own forces over all Lebanese territory. As for the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities, it is clearer, as it exclusively specifies the entities authorized to bear arms, which are: the Lebanese Army, the Internal Security Forces, General Security, State Security, Customs, and Municipal Police. Therefore, this is not an Israeli demand, but a fundamental Lebanese demand, stipulated in the Taif Agreement decades ago, and affirmed by subsequent international resolutions."

He said: "As for the comparison with the May 17th Agreement, it is not appropriate, because that agreement imposed on Lebanon a set of security obligations and restrictions, while what is required in the 'framework' is the extension of state authority over all its territory, which forms the basis for obtaining a full Israeli withdrawal. Lebanon agreed to this principle in 1989 with the adoption of the Taif Agreement, but its implementation was delayed over the past years."

In response to a question about whether accepting the framework agreement was an escape from a weaker agreement for fear of handing Lebanon over to Iran, he replied: "There are two different tracks: the Islamabad track, and the ceasefire track. The one who stops the fire is the party that fires. Is Lebanon the one that fires? Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are the ones who fire, and they have issued joint statements in this regard. I spoke with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and informed him that our only demand is to reach a ceasefire in Lebanon."

Prime Minister Salam denied that "Lebanon's entry into the Washington track was aimed at escaping the Islamabad track," and affirmed that "the decision for an actual ceasefire is linked to the parties that fire, i.e., Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard."

He pointed out that "the goal of the Washington track is to extract international recognition that the Lebanese state is the exclusive authority authorized to negotiate on behalf of Lebanon, and no one negotiates on its behalf. As for the Islamabad track, we sent greetings to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and we have no objection to thanking any country, whether Iran, Pakistan, or America, that contributed to supporting the inclusion of a clause for an immediate cessation of military operations in Lebanon."

Regarding the legal criticisms of Article 13 of the agreement, Prime Minister Salam asserted "that the text does not include any waiver of any of Lebanon's rights to prosecute Israel whatsoever, but rather stipulates the cessation or suspension of the right to resort to international courts as long as the negotiations are conducted in good faith."

He said: "We have not relinquished any right, and international humanitarian law, in its basic texts, does not allow anyone to waive any right. If we refer to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the law classifies these rights as (peremptory norms) that no party can legally drop."

He revealed the reason for the travel of Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Tarek Mitri to Geneva, noting that "this falls within the framework of the government's continued documentation of everything related to Israeli war crimes and violations through its channels in Geneva, to use them as a deterrent legal weapon in international courts if the negotiations deviate from their course."

Prime Minister Salam recalled "historical precedents in negotiations between states where political prosecutions were temporarily suspended to facilitate political solutions, including the experience of the National Liberation Front in Algeria during the 'Evian Accords,' and another example is the African National Congress ANC in South Africa."

He reaffirmed that "the primary goal of the agreement is to secure a full Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, enabling the return of the people of the south to their towns and villages safely, and opening the door for the reconstruction of areas destroyed by the war."

He added: "This matter is not within the realm of wishes, but is based on American pledges and commitments from international partners to contribute to the reconstruction process."

He explained that "the agreement, in return, entails a set of obligations on the Lebanese state, but they are not concessions of sovereignty or national rights, but rather consist of extending state authority over all Lebanese territory with its own forces, especially through the Lebanese army," and said: "If anyone considers that the agreement imposes on Lebanon a concession of its sovereignty or rights, let them specify where this concession lies."

In response to criticisms that "the agreement constitutes an external dictate," he opined that "the problem lies in the implementation mechanism, not the content," explaining that "extending state authority is an internal matter that should have been achieved since the Taif Agreement, but the delay in its accomplishment allowed external intervention linking Israeli withdrawal to the state's completion of its sovereignty."

He pointed out that "Israel requests security guarantees in return for its full withdrawal," noting that "this is not new, as the Armistice Agreement and Resolution 1701 also included security arrangements and guarantees." He recalled that "Resolution 1701 stipulates that southern Lebanon be a weapon-free zone," considering that "the Lebanese state should have, over the past years, implemented this commitment and not allowed the existence of tunnels, weapons depots, or military manifestations in the area, because that falls within the security arrangements that Israel was demanding."

He added: "What is required of Lebanon, in the essence of the agreement, does not go beyond extending state authority over all Lebanese territory, and achieving this automatically leads to the completion of the Israeli withdrawal."

He asked: "If some oppose the agreement, do they oppose the full Israeli withdrawal or do they oppose the extension of state authority?," considering that "everyone declares their support for the Israeli withdrawal, while the disagreement remains over the issue of the state's monopoly on weapons."

In response to a question about whether keeping weapons in the hands of Hezbollah makes the Israeli presence legitimate or temporary, Prime Minister Salam categorically denied this, affirming that "the agreement does not legitimize any Israeli presence inside Lebanese territory," rejecting "interpreting the agreement as linking the Israeli withdrawal to the complete disarmament of the party," affirming that "the adopted mechanism is gradual and mutual, and is not based on a condition of Israel's withdrawal after the complete handover of weapons." He cited "what was agreed upon regarding a pilot withdrawal from two areas (Pilot Zones), after which the Lebanese army will deploy in them and extend its authority, and this is a practical proof of the simultaneity of the two tracks."

He recalled the experience of the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, asking: "What did we do after the liberation?," and pointed out that "the Lebanese army did not immediately enter the liberated areas, but its deployment was delayed for years, while the current agreement stipulates the army's immediate entry into any area from which Israel withdraws, and this is a fundamental development."

Regarding the "pilot zones," he explained that "Israel talks about the towns of Zawtar al-Gharbiya and Zawtar al-Sharqiya, while the town of Froun is not included in the agreed-upon maps for withdrawal, despite being subject to Israeli fire and a kind of field control, and the discussion is not limited to these two towns only, but includes another group of villages," considering that "the description of two pilot zones relates to the mechanism for implementing the first phase of the withdrawal, not to limiting the geographical process to one area."

He explained that "the first phase of implementing the agreement includes the Israeli withdrawal from two pilot zones, and the intention is not one town, but the towns of Zawtar al-Gharbiya and Zawtar al-Sharqiya," expressing his hope that "the withdrawal from them will begin within a short period, within days or a few weeks."

He added: "The second pilot zone includes a number of towns, including Froun and al-Ghandouriya, and its specificity lies in the absence of Israeli forces or tanks stationed there, although it remains under Israeli military control by fire and surveillance."

He affirmed that "the Lebanese position remains firm, which is the demand for Israel's withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, from Naqoura to the last occupied point, and the priority in the next round of negotiations will be to set a clear timetable for completing the full Israeli withdrawal."

Regarding the entity authorized to verify that areas are free of any weapons outside the state framework, he explained that "Israel is not the judge in this process; rather, verification will be through an enhanced monitoring mechanism that may include a third party alongside the existing mechanism, which currently includes the United States and France, with the possibility of other countries or observers joining, and discussions are still ongoing in this regard."

He noted that "the presence of a third party for verification is not new, as UNIFIL forces have been playing this role since the issuance of Resolution 425 in 1978, not just since Resolution 1701 in 2006, and among its primary tasks is field verification of the implementation of security commitments."

Regarding reports talking about the possibility of an American military presence on the ground in Lebanon, he denied "any Lebanese request or approval in this regard," explaining that "American participation is limited to officers working within the monitoring mechanism established after the November 2024 understandings, who participate in field tours, without the presence of American forces or soldiers on the ground."

He pointed out that "the United States is handling this file with caution," revealing that "one of the previous Lebanese proposals was for Israel to withdraw from the five occupied points, in return for enhancing security guarantees through the presence of American officers alongside UNIFIL forces in those sites, but this proposal has not been adopted so far."

He also explained that "there are a number of issues that require clarification, pointing out that Article 52 of the Lebanese Constitution stipulates that the President of the Republic negotiates international treaties in agreement with the Prime Minister. After reaching any agreement, it is presented to the Council of Ministers for ratification. If it entails financial burdens or obligations that are renewed annually or the like, it is referred to the Chamber of Deputies according to constitutional procedures." He affirmed that "the government, as a government, does not undertake negotiations, and the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, who are committed to the ministerial statement, cannot negotiate outside the frameworks and constants set by this statement."

He said: "The negotiations started from the constants contained in the ministerial statement, which are based on working by all means to expel Israel from Lebanese territory, and extending the authority of the Lebanese state over all its territory with its own forces. Based on these two pillars, the President of the Republic, in agreement with him, led the negotiations, and upon reaching a final agreement, it is presented to the Council of Ministers for ratification. As for the current stage, the matter is still within the framework of discussion, without meaning that the Council of Ministers is deprived of discussing it, as it is natural for ministers to be informed of its details and express their opinions, but the agreement that requires ratification has not been completed yet."

He touched upon the call he made to the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Nabih Berri, explaining that he "thanked him for his intervention to prevent the dispute from spilling over into the street, and the risks that might accompany that in light of the existing polarization." He pointed out that "the calls for protest did not see wide participation," while affirming that "protesting is a natural right, but the fear was that things would slide into street clashes, which prompted him to salute Speaker Berri for his position."

He noted that "the call between them also addressed the essence of the agreement, where he stressed that the fundamental issue is the withdrawal of Israel and the extension of the Lebanese state's authority over all its territory," affirming that "everyone agrees on the necessity of the Israeli withdrawal, and there should be no disagreement over the principle of extending state authority." He noted that he informed Speaker Berri of "his readiness for dialogue at any time," considering that "these two pillars form the basis of any negotiating framework, and that Speaker Berri is keen to address this track through dialogue."

Prime Minister Salam expressed his concerns about "escalation due to the charged atmosphere and the accompanying misinformation, including the claim that there is no full withdrawal or abandonment of Lebanon's rights." He affirmed that "talking about repositioning means repositioning outside Lebanese territory, and that the government continues to collect and document everything related to Lebanon's rights," categorically denying "any waiver of them," stressing that "no one originally has the right to relinquish these rights."

He noted that "the formula adopted by the government is 'extending the authority of the Lebanese state with its own forces over all its territory,' which is the formula agreed upon by the Lebanese in the Taif Agreement, calling on anyone who objects to it to clearly declare their position." He also stressed "the necessity of reading the expressions contained in the texts within their full context, which speaks of the Lebanese state regaining its control over all its territory," affirming that "the goal is clear, which is that all weapons on Lebanese territory be under the command of the Lebanese state, whether they belong to Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, or any other party, because no state can exist with two armies, two decisions, or two weapons."

He pointed out that "this principle is not new; it was stipulated in the Taif Agreement, and several subsequent resolutions were issued by the Council of Ministers aimed at extending state authority with its own forces, but the circumstances of that period, especially during the Syrian guardianship, prevented their full implementation." He added that "Israel's withdrawal from the south at that time was not accompanied by the deployment of the Lebanese army as it should have been, while the situation today is different, especially after the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities in November 2024, which clearly specified the only entity authorized to bear arms in Lebanon."

He explained that "on the fifth of last August, the Council of Ministers tasked the Lebanese army with preparing an executive plan to monopolize weapons in the hands of the state alone. The army completed the plan and presented it to the Council in September, where it was welcomed, and the army began implementing its first phase, which consisted of five phases. However, field developments necessitated updating it to take into account new developments, while the primary goal remains fixed, which is monopolizing weapons in the hands of the state."

He stressed that "the government does not seek an armed clash with Hezbollah, but rather considers it its duty to prevent any confrontation. However, this does not mean succumbing to any blackmail or threat of civil war or sedition." He also stressed that "the plan to monopolize weapons is irreversible," considering that "its implementation has been delayed since the Taif Agreement for more than three decades, and the cost of this delay has been heavy in terms of lives, property, and the economy, and the time has come to make a decision, especially in light of the continued Israeli threats and the repercussions of the adventures that cost Lebanon billions of dollars."

He pointed out that "the political will is available to implement this plan, but its success requires enhancing the capabilities of the Lebanese army, so that it can deploy over all Lebanese territory and carry out its tasks. This prompted the government, in cooperation with France, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other countries, to prepare for a conference in Paris to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, before field developments prevented its convening." He noted that "the army is today required to deploy in the areas from which Israel withdraws, and to continue implementing the plan to monopolize weapons gradually in various Lebanese regions, in addition to controlling the borders and preventing smuggling operations between Lebanon and Syria."

Regarding the photo taken in Washington, he explained that "the Lebanese army adopts special protocols that prevent its officers from being photographed or shaking hands with the Israeli side," affirming his respect for these protocols, noting that "he sees no objection to taking photos at the meeting table, as happened with Ambassador Moawad and Ambassador Karam."

Regarding the army command, he refused to be drawn into the debate surrounding the army commander, considering that "raising this file represents another form of sedition." He affirmed that "the political authority sets the directions, while the military institution implements its decisions," noting that "the army's performance in the first phase of implementing the plan to monopolize weapons was largely satisfactory, despite some gaps, especially in the area between the Litani River and the border."

He spoke about the Rawsheh incident, considering that "the breach was not solely on the part of the army, but Hezbollah did not adhere to the commitments it had previously made in this regard, which disappointed him and Speaker Berri." He noted that "he wished the security forces and the army had acted more firmly in implementing the government's decision, and he informed the relevant authorities that what happened was unacceptable."

Regarding the criticisms related to security appointments, he affirmed that they "were issued by the Council of Ministers, and therefore responsibility for them cannot be disclaimed," explaining that "he may not possess the military expertise that the President of the Republic has in evaluating officers, but he bears full political responsibility and does not disclaim it."

He stressed again that "he does not seek a confrontation with Hezbollah, but at the same time he refuses for the government to be subject to any blackmail," affirming that "he only asks the party to adhere to what it pledged in the Taif Agreement, Resolution 1701, the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities, and the ministerial statement on the basis of which the Hezbollah deputies granted the government confidence, which also stipulates monopolizing the decision of war and peace in the hands of the state." He expressed his hope that "Hezbollah will adhere to these pledges," considering that "Lebanon is going through a pivotal moment and an hour of truth, which requires enabling the Lebanese army to play its role, and everyone's commitment to what they previously pledged under the umbrella of the constitution and the pact."

Regarding the Taif Agreement and whether we have entered an era of trade-offs, he replied: "I still adhere to the Taif Agreement because it was the tool that allowed us to put an end to the civil war and close that chapter. Practice has shown that it contains a number of gaps, and we must work to fill them. But before that, we must complete its implementation, because it was designed as an integrated package, a 'Package Deal,' but it was applied selectively."

He said: "There are a number of basic clauses that have not been implemented, including expanded administrative decentralization as stipulated in the agreement, as well as Article 95 of the constitution concerning the establishment of a national body to undertake studies and take necessary steps to abolish political sectarianism. Also, the electoral law based on governorates, as some clauses were distorted during implementation, and others were not implemented at all, such as the electoral law, in addition to gaps that appeared with practice, and it is supposed to work on addressing them. What is required is to work on filling these gaps, and where necessary, develop the Taif Agreement; we should not fear that."

Regarding the talk of weapons in exchange for a new system, he said: "This matter is not on the table at all. Weapons are not in exchange for a new system; rather, people want security, and security is the path that restarts the economic engine, allows the country to rise, and attracts investments. We have promising opportunities today, and if we do not monopolize weapons, we will miss this opportunity as well. We have wasted enough opportunities in our modern history."

He added: "The first opportunity was after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, when we hesitated to deploy the army to the south, so the opportunity was lost. Then we missed another opportunity after the Syrian withdrawal. Today, we no longer have time to waste more opportunities, and we will not allow it to be missed again."

Regarding the file of displacement and reconstruction, he said: "Throughout the past weeks, we have been preparing for this day when people can return to their homes and lands. We have put plans in place for everything related to infrastructure, from communications to electricity and water. We have a plan for each area from which Israel withdraws, so that the state enters it immediately. Two days ago, we held an expanded meeting with the Minister of Communications and all concerned parties in the sector, and a clear plan was put in place to restart 90% of the communications network within 10 days in the areas from which withdrawal occurs."

He added: "The same applies to the return of the residents. It is true that many will not be able to return directly to their homes due to the complete destruction that some villages have suffered, and therefore we are working to prepare a number of prefabricated houses to be set up immediately in the vicinity of those villages, allowing residents to stay close to their original homes. We have also secured the necessary funding to immediately begin restoring buildings that can be restored."

In response to a question about why the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not issue a special statement welcoming this agreement? We saw an Emirati welcome, but we did not see a similar position from Saudi Arabia? He said: "A statement was issued by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, which represents all Arab countries from the Comoros to Mauritania, and declared its support for this framework. A clear statement was also issued by the Gulf Cooperation Council supporting this track."

He concluded: "The criterion for success for us is that we are able to achieve Israel's withdrawal, the return of our people to the south, and the start of the reconstruction process. But this must be accompanied by another track no less important, which is the track of reforms we have begun, especially financial reforms, because without them no economic recovery can be achieved. We want to rebuild the country, and this is our project."