Behind Sanctions Lines: How the Secret 'VODJA' Network Renewed Iran's Missile Arsenal

A Reuters investigation revealed that Tehran established a secret military and financial network comprising more than 5,000 entities and commercial fronts, through which it imported equipment, explosives, and heavy trucks worth at least $2 billion since early 2025, bypassing the US naval blockade and Western sanctions.

The investigation stated that these entities, operating in secrecy, bear names beginning with "VODJA," an acronym for the Iranian Ministry of Defense, confirming that transactions involving these entities are linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and business groups known as "Bonyads" under the control of the Iranian elite.

Massive Quantities
The findings uncover one of the war's greatest mysteries: how does the IRGC replenish its arsenals of missiles and drones while launching them by the thousands?

The investigation clarified that during the eighteen months from January 2025 to June 2026—a period including the first four months of this year's war—just one entity among these, VODJA 346428, imported massive quantities of rocket fuel, explosives, and weapon components essential for manufacturing drones and missiles, as well as heavy trucks that can be used as missile launch platforms.

The investigation added that this equipment reached Iran by land, sea, and air, with records showing that a significant portion came from China, Russia, and Germany.

This investigation into the Iranian Ministry of Defense network is based on thousands of Iranian banking and government records, corporate registration documents, and import data.

All secret entities share a single address in Tehran, identical to that of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. These agencies list their founding date as February 11, 1979, the day Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah's regime.

According to the investigation, records showed that most of these entities were actually founded in 2013, while Iran was suffering under sanctions that led to a decline in crude oil exports and a collapse of its currency.

These entities, identified by Reuters for the first time in collaboration with the Israeli-American risk consultancy firm "240 Analitix," form the backbone of Iran's military procurement and sanctions evasion system.

These entities manage a network of individuals acting as fronts and foreign shell companies, known as "trustees," who use proceeds from illicit oil sales to purchase goods for Tehran.

Senior military leaders involved in Iran's ballistic missile and drone programs utilize this network.

Phone numbers registered under 91 of these entities appear in the records of Sepah Bank belonging to IRGC members with accounts there; among them are at least two commanders accused by the United States of committing violations against civilian protesters.

The investigation noted that while the Iranian military has been subject to multiple US sanctions for decades, there is no evidence that any of the entities mentioned in the documents have been placed on Western sanctions lists.

Miada Maki, a former senior official at the US Treasury Department who helped establish the US sanctions program on Iran, said, "What we see here is the military lifeline of the regime during this conflict and for many years before it. This is the entire integrated system of the Iranian military's business operations."

The arms import network provided much of the raw material Tehran needs to manufacture missiles and drones; these weapons are responsible for Iran's continuous precision attacks on energy facilities in the Gulf, allowing Tehran to limit the impact of the US military strike.

Other reports this year showed how Iran withstood US pressures by exploiting cryptocurrency trading platforms and illegal gambling networks to generate illicit revenue and evade sanctions, how the IRGC strengthened its control over the Strait of Hormuz, and how the war ushered in a new era of repression in Iran.

In tracking imports, Reuters reviewed part of approximately 19,000 import records by comparing them with shipping documents, social media footage, and state media reports.

Data shows that nearly all materials imported by Iran were exempt from customs duties and specifically classified as military equipment.

Experts pointed out that many imports, even explosives, could be considered dual-use, and thus may also have civilian applications.

The Wall Street Journal published a report on some shipments coming from China on September 23.

Parallel System
Maki, who until last year served as Deputy Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the US Treasury, said that the secret military entities constitute a parallel foreign trade system to the official global economy, enabling Iran to spend money earned abroad from illicit oil sales on military equipment.

The investigation explained that funds rarely cross borders, as doing so might trigger alerts regarding sanctions violations; instead, import data showed that transactions for 97% of the shipments reviewed by Reuters were settled "without transferring money."

Trusted intermediaries among Iranians residing abroad purchased goods using funds deposited in foreign banks and then shipped them to Iran.

Among the entities obtaining their needs through this network is the military unit overseeing Iran's ballistic missile programs; also included is Tondar Sahra ("Desert Thunder") company, sanctioned by Washington in 2024 for manufacturing and supplying drones to Russia that caused destruction in Ukraine.

Reuters and 240 Analitix traced the Iranian military units by matching import data with corporate records, emails, and documents collected by the WikiIran website.

Reuters could not identify the operators of WikiIran, a website that receives leaked documents from Iran and claims it is run by Iranian government opponents "forced to live in exile."

Rebuilding Iran's Arsenal
According to import databases for the first six months of this year, shipments included detonators worth $1.9 million, tons of explosives, aircraft engine parts, rocket fuel components, and heavy launch vehicles.

Weapons and sanctions experts said all these materials can be used as key components for making and launching ballistic missiles and drones, including Shahed aircraft.

Peter Salisbury, an adjunct associate professor at Columbia University who has spent the last few years studying Iranian arms transfers and supply chains, said, "This appears to be a widespread effort to rebuild or expand Iran's current arsenal" of drones and missiles.

He added, "This data clearly demonstrates the Iranian system's ability to adapt and find new pathways."

Imports entered Iran aboard cargo ships via the Caspian Sea from Russia, by truck from Central Asia, and on cargo planes from China, according to import data and documents.

For its part, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it was "unaware of the situation," adding, "We strongly reject attempts to maliciously link combat activities in the region to China or smear China's reputation."