Iranian spy networks in Turkey revealed by Israeli website

For more than four decades, Iranian Quds Force networks and Hezbollah cells have been active across Turkish cities, according to an Israeli website. The report, citing Iranian activists and dissidents, states that the Quds Force has been expanding its influence and running sleeper cells in Turkey since the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025.

The Iranian plan involves recruiting large numbers of Turks, Afghans, Pakistanis, and Arabs living in Turkey with financial incentives, tasking them with intelligence missions and attacks on American and Israeli economic and political interests within the country. Sources told the Israeli outlet that these recruits are also transported to Iran and integrated into militias loyal to the Revolutionary Guard for intelligence and military operations inside Iran.

Arrests and documented operations

Turkish authorities arrested six people, including an Iranian national, on January 29 on charges of espionage and gathering military information for Tehran. The arrests followed coordinated raids across five provinces. The detainees are accused of collecting data on military bases and other sensitive sites inside and outside Turkey, in coordination with Iranian intelligence.

While Turkish journalists and political observers acknowledge Iran's pervasive influence in their country, they deny Tehran's ability to carry out operations within Turkey, the report notes. Middle East researcher and journalist Ismail Goktan provided an analysis to media outlets, confirming "the existence of groups that still receive direct or indirect support from Iran, as well as other groups influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, including Turkish Islamists and Kurds."

Political proxies and historical ties

According to the researcher, two main movements exemplify Iranian influence in Turkey: one Turkish and one Kurdish. The first is the Felicity Party, a splinter from the Iran-linked Welfare Party, which views Iran's supreme leader positively. The second is the Huda Par Party, the political wing of the formerly armed Hezbollah movement, alongside smaller groups influenced by the Iranian system.

Iran has spent years trying to build a reliable axis in Turkey, but it cannot replicate the model it established in Iraq, Lebanon, or even Syria. Most Iran-influenced Islamic movements in Turkey restrict their activities to political or propaganda fields, the report explains.

The Israeli site cited Iran's official IRNA news agency, which reported on April 15 a joint meeting in the Iranian city of Tabriz. The gathering brought together pro-Iranian Turkish journalists and activists with their Iranian counterparts to prepare what the agency called "resistance media" spanning both countries, described as "an essential part of the war Iran is waging against the United States and Israel." Among the attendees was journalist Nurdin Shirin, known for his loyalty to Iran.

Violent past and recruitment strategies

Analyses in Ankara cited by the report highlight the "bloody history of Iranian influence in Turkey." In the 1990s, Iranian cells operating under the "Peace and Unity" organization—a secret Turkish group loyal to the Revolutionary Guard—carried out a series of attacks and assassinations targeting prominent figures, activists, and journalists in Turkish cities. Simultaneously, the Revolutionary Guard ran another organization in southeastern Turkey, a Kurdish group called "Hezbollah," whose fighters and members received intensive military and intelligence training from Quds Force officers.

Iran's focus is not limited to recruiting Turkish agents. It actively recruits refugees and urban residents, particularly Arabs whose numbers have grown since the start of the so-called "Arab Spring," especially Syrians, followed by Lebanese, Palestinians, as well as Pakistanis and Afghans. Investigative information indicates Iran has played a pivotal role in establishing secret cells worldwide, particularly in the region, using its diplomatic tools to recruit activists, journalists, and prominent figures to work for its agenda.

The Revolutionary Guard's primary methods for conducting operations abroad extend beyond embassies and diplomatic channels. Information relayed by the Israeli report from Iranian opposition in Europe points to widespread recruitment of regime agents within media and press institutions, political lobbying groups, research centers, as well as academic figures, social networks, and charitable, cultural, and religious organizations. These quietly carry out operations and attacks against Western interests using recruits of various nationalities.