Rebellion Against Parliament and Government: Sulaymaniyah Threatens to Sever Ties with Erbil

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is no longer just facing a stalled government formation crisis; it now confronts the possibility of disintegrating the authority that has united Erbil and Sulaymaniyah under one political roof, following the escalation of disputes between the two main parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

The dispute between the parties took a sharp turn after the PUK announced its withdrawal from the government yesterday, Thursday, refusing to recognize the new parliament and threatening to form parallel institutions in Sulaymaniyah.

Observers agree that this escalation puts the entire regional experiment on trial, after years during which both sides maintained a minimum level of understanding and coordination despite disagreements over position distribution and spheres of influence.

The announcement by PUK leader Bafel Talabani, son of the late renowned leader Jalal Talabani, came in response to the parliamentary session held in Erbil on Wednesday, during which Vala Farid, the KDP candidate, was elected Speaker of Parliament with the attendance of 52 out of 100 MPs, while PUK blocs, the New Generation Movement, and other parties boycotted the session.

Talabani considered the session unrepresentative of the parliament's will, announcing his party's withdrawal from the existing government and warning that any unilateral step to appoint a President of the Region, Prime Minister, or ministers would be met with similar steps by the PUK.

Experts believe this threat carries implications beyond verbal escalation, as it opens the door to reproducing the model of dual authorities.

Roots of the Crisis

The roots of the crisis date back to the parliamentary elections held in October 2024, after being postponed four times due to disputes. The results saw the KDP take the lead with 39 seats, compared to 23 for the PUK and 15 for the New Generation Movement, out of 100 seats.

However, these results did not translate into an agreement on forming a new government. The KDP, led by Masoud Barzani, believes its electoral victory grants it a leading role in managing the region, while the PUK insists on the power-sharing formula that has governed relations between the parties for decades.

The crisis reveals a deeper divergence in how the parties envision governance. The KDP seeks to strengthen centralization of decision-making in the region, particularly around Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, while the PUK wants to ensure actual partnership commensurate with its political weight and historical influence in Sulaymaniyah.

Thus, the dispute over the speakership, premiership, and presidency reflects a struggle over the rules of partnership itself, and whether the region will be managed through balance between the parties or according to the equation of electoral majority.

Legacy of Division Resurfaces

This division is by no means new in the political life of the Kurdish region; it has historically been linked to the struggle for influence between the Barzani and Talabani families, dating back to the 1970s when Talabani split from Barzani's party and founded the PUK.

The competition between the two sides turned into internal fighting during the 1990s, culminating in the Kurdish civil war between 1994 and 1998, before Washington intervened, particularly then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to broker a reconciliation, resulting in the region practically settling into two separate administrations between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

With the 2006 power-sharing agreement, the two sides moved to merge the administrations into one government, distributing positions and ministries in a way that allowed the region to overcome the phase of fighting and strengthen its constitutional status within Iraq.

But that agreement did not completely end the duality of influence, which helps explain why the current political dispute could escalate further, according to experts.

An analysis by "Chatham House" warns that the region is already experiencing a de facto geographical and political division.

Baghdad

The political conflict overlaps with economic disputes. Management of oil revenues, distribution of financial resources, and relations with Baghdad are all contentious files between the parties, which Talabani invoked in his recent speech.

Experts suggest that the repercussions of the crisis will not stop at the region's borders. Continued division weakens its negotiating position vis-à-vis Baghdad, whether in files related to oil, budget, salaries, or issues concerning federal powers and disputed areas. It also undermines its ability to present itself as a unified political actor in its relations with Washington and Brussels.

Militarization of the Dispute

The danger of the current confrontation is not limited to civilian institutions but extends to one of the most sensitive files in the region: the unification of military forces. Approximately 100,000 Peshmerga elements remain distributed among military formations linked to the KDP and PUK, receiving orders through separate party leaderships, according to estimates cited by international reports.

In September 2026, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs announced the completion of reorganizing forces under a unified command structure. However, the escalation places this achievement under practical test, as successful paper-based unification does not necessarily guarantee their neutralization from inter-party conflict.

Beyond the Region

The Kurdistan crisis is inseparable from developments in Iraq, especially its coincidence with the US withdrawal and Baghdad's stalled efforts to disarm Iran-linked factions.

Washington links the future of its security relations with Baghdad to reducing the influence of these groups, while Tehran seeks to maintain its network of influence within Iraqi institutions, having represented armed factions as one of its most important tools of presence in the country.

Under these circumstances, the unity of the Kurdistan Region gains additional importance. The region constitutes a traditional security partner for the United States, possessing special institutions and Peshmerga forces, yet finds itself facing a more complex security environment after the US withdrawal. Notably, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs warned against the departure of American forces without establishing an alternative air defense system, pointing out that the region has suffered more than a thousand attacks with missiles and drones from Iran.

A political and security paradox emerges here: while Washington pressures Baghdad to end the phenomenon of weapons outside state institutions, the conflict between the Kurdish parties threatens to undermine institutional unity.

According to experts, the continuation of this division would weaken Erbil's ability to protect its interests and negotiate with Baghdad, granting Iran wider space to influence Iraq's internal balances.

The Two Administrations Model

According to analyses, there are three expected scenarios. The first involves returning to negotiations and reaching a settlement that brings the PUK back into participating in the government.

The second path involves continuing to form institutions in Erbil without PUK participation, while the latter refuses to recognize them and establishes parallel administrative and political arrangements in Sulaymaniyah. This could deepen the existing division and return the region to the model of two administrations.

The third path carries the probability of continued deadlock, where institutions formally exist but lose their capacity to make unified decisions, and the current government continues to perform its duties amidst a political legitimacy crisis and jurisdictional disputes.

Experts note that the PUK's threat to form a parallel authority does not mean that administrative division is a foregone conclusion. That requires complex political, financial, and security arrangements, as well as considering the repercussions on relations with Baghdad and the international community. Moreover, a return to armed fighting is not an automatic result of escalation, especially since both parties realize the cost of repeating the experience of civil war.