Intelligence and Weapons: Why Are Russia and China Supporting the Houthis?

According to a report by The National Interest, Russian and Chinese support for the Houthi group in Yemen goes beyond political relations. It includes providing satellite-based intelligence, contributing to securing weapon manufacturing components, and facilitating the group's access to fuel and supplies.
This cooperation raises growing concerns about the Houthis becoming a regional pressure tool serving the interests of Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran, aimed at undermining US influence and threatening international navigation security.

The Iranian Role
Iran, the group's main backer, benefits from the Houthis' ability to target commercial ships and threaten navigation traffic in the Red Sea. This enhances the impact of pressures Tehran exerts on the Strait of Hormuz. The coincidence of these threats has contributed to disruptions in energy markets and rising oil prices.

Security data in the report indicates that Iranian support since the first decade of the millennium helped transform the Houthis from a group relying on weapons seized from Yemeni forces into a power possessing an arsenal including ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles.

The group used these capabilities to attack commercial ships between 2023 and 2025, announcing that its operations were in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.

Chinese Components and Russian Intelligence
A report issued in October 2026 by the Conflict Armament Research organization revealed that the group is seeking to locally manufacture the Iranian medium-range "Kheibar Shekan" missile using Chinese components. This could grant it greater capability to target distant areas within Saudi Arabia.

According to armament experts, Chinese companies topped the list of entities that manufactured weapon components whose shipments were intercepted while en route to the Houthis between 2021 and 2025.

Furthermore, the US State Department accused the Chinese company Chang Guang Satellite Technology of providing the Houthis with space imagery used to target US military sites during the air campaign against the group in spring 2025.

As for Russia, it transferred naval targeting information to the Houthis via Iran's Revolutionary Guard during their attacks on commercial ships. Reports also indicated that it provides satellite information to support attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Moscow also considered sending anti-ship missiles to the group before backing down following objections from Washington and Riyadh.

Data from the US Treasury Department indicates that the relationship between Moscow and the Houthis also includes networks for supplying weapons, oil, and stolen Ukrainian grain to areas under the group's control, helping Russia bypass international sanctions.

International Coordination Against the Houthis
These relationships reveal a convergence of interests between Iran, Russia, and China, despite differences in how each country deals with the group according to the report. While Moscow hosts high-level Houthi delegations, Beijing maintains communication channels with them to ensure the safe passage of its ships through the Red Sea.

Efforts to contain the group face obstacles due to the lack of Western consensus on classifying it as a terrorist organization, as well as divergent positions between the United States and Europe regarding the nature of military and economic engagement with them.

The recommendations presented in the report call for broader US coordination with Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized Yemeni government, supporting Yemeni forces, unifying international maritime missions to monitor the Red Sea and intercept weapon shipments, and expanding sanctions to include companies and institutions funding arms purchases.

This approach views isolating the Houthis financially, militarily, and diplomatically as a way to limit their capabilities without forcing Washington to directly engage in military strikes against them.