US Directed-Energy Weapons Depend on China’s Rare Minerals Supply Chains

The Israeli military has issued evacuation warnings to residents of five towns in southern Lebanon and western Bekaa, instructing them to move north of the Zahrani River.

The United States’ efforts to develop directed-energy weapons, presented as a solution to the depletion of interceptors in modern air defense systems, confront a significant challenge: dependence on rare minerals and materials whose global supply chains are dominated by China, according to National Interest.

These weapons include high-energy lasers and high-power microwave systems, which promise near-light-speed interception capabilities and lower operational costs compared to traditional interceptor missiles.

This supply dilemma gained attention following the Iran war of 2026, which revealed high consumption rates of interceptor missiles amid waves of drone and missile attacks. A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies stated that the United States and its allies exhausted large stocks of key interceptor missiles within weeks, raising questions about sustaining such expenditure in a prolonged conflict or in another theater of operations.

These developments have accelerated US military programs related to directed-energy weapons. The US Navy tested the Helios laser system aboard the USS Preble destroyer, while the Army evaluated prototypes of the directed-energy system known as EM Shorad. Additionally, indications have emerged of Israel employing the Iron Beam system to intercept Iranian drones.

Reflecting this shift, the US Army and Navy have allocated approximately $676 million to develop a new joint laser system with capabilities ranging from 150 kilowatts to 300 kilowatts or higher, aimed at intercepting cruise missiles.

Although these systems aim to reduce reliance on interceptor missiles, they do not eliminate dependence on industrial supply chains. Instead, the focus shifts toward energy production and storage, as well as securing the materials necessary for manufacturing and operating these weapons.

Rather than prioritizing the quantity of available missiles, the emphasis turns to securing gallium used in power electronics, germanium required for optics and sensors, and neodymium employed in high-strength magnets.

Directed-energy weapons depend on four main elements within their supply chains. The first involves permanent magnets made from neodymium and praseodymium, essential for directing laser beams and operating critical components in microwave weapons.

The second element covers power electronics, which rely on semiconductors made from gallium nitride, capacitors containing tantalum, and electronic switches based on gallium arsenide.

The third element pertains to optics and sensors. Targeting systems require germanium lenses and specialized optical fibers that depend on rare earth elements such as yttrium and erbium. Microwave systems also incorporate tungsten and insulating ceramics in some components.

The fourth element concerns the energy itself. Operating these systems demands a broad electrical infrastructure encompassing power generation, storage, distribution, and thermal management. For example, a 150-kilowatt combat laser may require several times its operational power capacity when accounting for cooling and energy management needs.

China plays a central role in this equation. It not only dominates the processing of critical metals used in these systems but is also developing and deploying its own directed-energy weapons.

Among China’s systems are the Silent Hunter laser with power ranging from 30 to 100 kilowatts, the CASIC LY-1 naval laser deployed by the Chinese Navy, and mobile microwave systems such as the Hurricane 3000 designed to counter drone swarms.

China is also developing ground-based anti-satellite laser systems and microwave weapons intended to disrupt satellite networks in low Earth orbit, including systems targeting constellations like Starlink.

Chinese influence extends beyond the metals sector. Beijing controls about 80% of the manufacturing ecosystem for clean energy technologies, including batteries, power electronics, electricity storage components, and power grid modernization—elements directly linked to the infrastructure needed to operate directed-energy weapons.

In response to these challenges, the US Department of Defense has initiated measures to strengthen domestic and allied supply chains. These include allocating $258 million to Lynas Rare Earths to build a heavy rare earth separation facility in Texas, funding projects to extract gallium from industrial waste in Louisiana, and efforts to revive tungsten mining within the United States.

The approach to addressing these challenges is based on three main pillars: ensuring stable, long-term demand for industry; integrating raw material risks into military planning and system design; and developing a multi-layered air defense architecture combining guns, interceptor missiles, lasers, and microwave weapons.

This strategy recognizes that directed-energy weapons will not fully replace interceptor missiles due to limitations related to weather, range, power, and target characteristics. Instead, they will form part of a broader defensive system relying on diversified combat means and supply sources.

As future military systems increasingly depend on electricity, securing raw materials and energy infrastructure becomes a fundamental aspect of air defense. The future of warfare is progressively oriented toward electromagnetic systems powered by energy.