From 'Miyun' to Bab al-Mandeb: Houthis Put International Navigation 'Under Fire'

From a position overlooking the entrance to the international maritime corridor on Miyun Island, a Houthi leadership figure appeared in a widely circulated video, explaining to a group of militia fighters the importance of expanding into this region, stating they no longer need drones or cruise missiles, as positioning artillery on the island's high ground is sufficient to target ships in all directions.

Regardless of the precise operational value of what was said in the clip, it summarizes one dimension of the recent field transformation, as the Houthis have extended their control along the western coast of Yemen up to locations and islands situated at the southern entrance of the Red Sea.

This new development is not merely about the Houthis gaining additional territory in Yemen, but about possessing advanced geography directly connected to the international navigation theater, adding a new dimension to the maritime capabilities the group has used over recent years.

During their attacks on commercial vessels since October 2023, the Houthis primarily relied on missiles, drones, and explosive boats; however, controlling coastal and island positions near Bab al-Mandeb grants them, according to experts, greater room for surveillance, maneuvering, and targeting, while reducing the distance between deployment sites and shipping lanes, complicating efforts to contain their influence.

This equation becomes even more sensitive amid disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and the resulting congestion in energy and trade flows—further enhancing the strategic value of Bab al-Mandeb as one of the alternative passages between Asia and Europe.

Maritime traffic through the strait saw a sharp decline the day after the Houthis reached Miyun Island (Prym), with only around 15 vessels passing through, compared to an average of 37 vessels per day during May and June of last year—a clear indicator reflecting not just rising military risk, but also the extent of risks that shipping and insurance companies now factor into route planning.

Iranian Investment

This shift cannot be separated from the Iranian dimension accompanying the evolution of Houthi capabilities, amid reports of expanding roles for Revolutionary Guard experts inside Yemen, and according to sources, their transition from providing support and advice and managing external operations to direct command of recent battles along the western coast.

For Iran, having a militant ally near Bab al-Mandeb provides an additional card in a highly complex regional environment where Yemeni geography becomes part of a broader pressure system stretching from the Gulf to the Red Sea—especially as the importance of maritime corridors increases whenever one faces disruption.

In the same context, Iranian officials welcomed the latest Houthi advance, viewing it as part of a wider regional confrontation, reinforcing interpretations that see these coastal developments as more than just a military shift within Yemen.

Yemeni Prime Minister Shaeer al-Zindani affirmed on Saturday that the Houthi escalation along the western coast extends beyond local dimensions and is linked to an Iranian agenda exploiting Yemen’s strategic location to threaten regional security and international navigation, while emphasizing that these battlefield developments do not determine the war’s outcome.

Internal Losses

While the Houthis accumulate military and geopolitical gains from their coastal expansion, these gains are not reflected similarly in Yemen’s national interest, especially since the western coast represents a major economic gateway housing ports, fishing grounds, and communities dependent on the sea.

With four Red Sea-facing ports now under the group’s control, elements of geographic strength meant to boost development and stimulate trade are instead forcibly redefined, turning economic assets into leverage points in conflict.

In the short term, militarizing these western coasts means increased risks for incoming shipping, reduced attractiveness of ports and coastal areas for investment, higher costs for transport, insurance, and services tied to maritime gateways, alongside damage to local commercial activities.

Fishing stands out as one of the most severely affected sectors in the Red Sea. According to Fuad Duhla, president of the Al-Khokha Fishermen’s Association, in a previous statement to Al-Mesbar News, the escalating military activity in the Red Sea since 2023 has led to the deaths of nearly 70 fishermen and forced others to abandon their profession, losing family income sources.

The consequences extend beyond fishermen alone; declining fish catches disrupt an entire economic chain—from boats and cold storage facilities to transport, markets, and traders—and also impact food security in a country already facing high levels of dependency.

The broader loss lies in the potential long-term erosion of the coast’s economic function even after the war ends: restoring confidence among shipping, insurance, and investment firms in Yemeni ports requires a stable environment, infrastructure rehabilitation, and long-term security guarantees, while coastal installations remain vulnerable to damage and targeting as long as they remain part of the operational theater.

Herein lies the irony: as the western coast grows in military significance in the calculations of the Houthis and their allies, its economic value declines, transforming it into a regional pressure platform disconnected from serving Yemen’s interests or those of its people.