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World
India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty heightens water security tensions with Pakistan, threatening agricultural and energy sectors dependent on the river basin.
Concerns are mounting in South Asia over the potential for water resources to become a new source of conflict between India and Pakistan, following New Delhi’s confirmation that it has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty. This agreement, established in 1960, governs the sharing of the Indus River basin waters between the two countries.
Although actual water flows have not yet shown significant changes, the reduction in technical coordination and data exchange between the two sides has introduced a new phase of uncertainty. This development could have broad strategic and security implications in the coming years.
The Indus River basin is fundamental to Pakistan’s water and food security, supplying between 80% and 90% of the agricultural sector’s needs, which in turn produces about 90% of the country’s food. The basin also supports a large portion of drinking water, municipal supplies, and hydroelectric power generation.
Pakistan’s water storage capacity is limited, with estimates indicating reserves sufficient for only about 90 days. This figure is considerably lower than regional and global averages, increasing the basin’s vulnerability. Additionally, rapid population growth, inadequate water infrastructure, inefficient irrigation systems, and climate change impacts such as droughts, floods, and erratic rainfall patterns exacerbate the situation.
So far, there have been no confirmed signs of a significant decrease in water volumes reaching Pakistan, partly because India lacks sufficient infrastructure to divert or store large quantities of the western rivers allocated to Pakistan. However, the most evident effect is the halt of official coordination mechanisms, especially the exchange of river flow data, early flood warnings, and technical communication between the two countries.
This breakdown complicates Pakistan’s agricultural planning and water resource management, particularly during critical seasons that depend heavily on accurate water level forecasts.
Professor Sriparna Patak, an Asian studies professor at O.P. Jindal Global University, told "Iram News" that suspending the treaty gives India greater strategic leverage over Pakistan by virtue of its position as the upstream state controlling the main tributaries of the river system crucial to Pakistan.
Patak explained that although India cannot completely halt water flows in the near term, it can employ various technical and operational measures. These include accelerating storage and dam projects, utilizing its unused water share more effectively, improving reservoir and hydroelectric facility management, and adjusting water flow timings to exert increased pressure on critical sectors in Pakistan, especially during drought seasons.
According to Patak, these actions represent a calculated response by India rather than an impulsive escalation, linked to national security concerns and efforts to counter what New Delhi describes as support for cross-border militant groups. The full impact of these policies is expected to accumulate gradually as new infrastructure projects progress.
India is advancing several hydropower and river management projects within the Indus basin, including initiatives on the Chenab River and plans to divert portions of some tributaries to other river systems within India. Although many of these projects remain in planning or early execution stages, Islamabad views them as steps that could enhance India’s control over water flow timing in the future, posing a direct threat to Pakistan’s water security.
Patak noted that India’s economic, financial, and engineering capabilities enable it to pursue these projects over the long term. Constructing additional storage and control facilities will increase New Delhi’s influence over water resource management in the basin in the coming years.
Water experts emphasize that any substantial alteration in river flows requires large dams and reservoirs, which take many years and significant investment to impact actual water distribution. Pakistan also faces persistent internal disputes among provinces regarding water management and new dam projects.
Provinces located downstream, such as Sindh and Balochistan, fear that new dams will reduce their water shares, while other regions advocate for additional storage projects to address growing shortages. The "Green Pakistan" project last year highlighted the political difficulty of reaching consensus on major water initiatives, as local protests forced the government to suspend the project despite federal and military support.
Patak believes these internal challenges, combined with weak water management and economic pressures, make Pakistan more vulnerable to any future changes in the Indus basin’s water administration, even if those changes begin on a limited scale.
In the short term, the conflict is likely to remain confined to diplomatic pressures and political exchanges. However, the most concerning scenario involves India significantly expanding its storage capacity and altering water release schedules during sensitive agricultural seasons. In such a case, Pakistan may escalate diplomatic efforts and internationalize the issue, linking water disputes to broader security tensions with India. This could increase the risk of border crises and limited confrontations.
Patak pointed to experiences in other regions, such as Turkey’s management of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and China’s control of Mekong River dams, as examples of how upstream countries can use water resources as geopolitical leverage. She asserted that India aims to strengthen its strategic position by capitalizing on geographic and economic advantages, while retaining the option to return to cooperative arrangements if relations with Pakistan improve substantially and sustainably.
Observers consider the likelihood of a full-scale "water war" low due to strong deterrents, including the interconnected nature of the river systems, the high economic and humanitarian costs of widespread disruption, and the nuclear capabilities of both countries, which raise the stakes of any escalation.
Although a direct water conflict seems unlikely in the near future, the ongoing erosion of cooperation mechanisms between New Delhi and Islamabad may add to the fragility of their relationship, complicating crisis management in one of the world’s most volatile regions.
