China and India Compete for Control of Strategic Sea Routes in Bay of Bengal

The Bay of Bengal is rapidly becoming a critical zone for geopolitical competition in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as China accelerates efforts to secure a more stable access route to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and Bangladesh. Meanwhile, India is responding by strengthening its naval presence and upgrading military and logistical infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and around the Malacca Strait.

This rivalry reflects a shift in the conflict between the two Asian powers from their land borders to a prolonged contest over ports, trade routes, supply chains, and maritime infrastructure, according to Asia Times.

India’s 2026 National Maritime Security Strategy identifies the eastern Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal as central to strategic competition in the coming years. The strategy emphasizes increasing control over ports, logistics networks, energy infrastructure, and digital connectivity as key tools for maritime influence, moving beyond reliance solely on traditional military power.

China’s moves occur amid growing challenges to its overland connectivity projects. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has become more vulnerable due to attacks by armed groups in Balochistan.

The global helium crisis is worsening, with China restricting supplies and Europe suffering the most.

Additionally, the US-Iran conflict and sanctions have heightened uncertainty over transit routes through Iran, while Eurasian and Central corridors continue to face multiple political and logistical constraints.

In response, China is reassessing its priorities by enhancing the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which provides Yunnan province with direct access to the Bay of Bengal via the Kyaukpyu port. This route bypasses the Malacca Strait and western passages that are more prone to disruption.

Existing oil and gas pipelines, along with plans for roads and railways, support this strategy, boosting Beijing’s capacity to secure trade and energy flows to southwest China.

However, ongoing internal conflict in Myanmar renders sole reliance on this route risky, prompting China to broaden its vision to include Bangladesh within a trilateral economic corridor. This corridor adds new ports, logistics hubs, and industrial capabilities to China’s network in the northern Bay of Bengal.

Chattogram and Mongla ports play crucial roles in this plan by offering operational alternatives should Kyaukpyu port face disruptions, thereby granting China greater flexibility in accessing the Indian Ocean.

Conversely, New Delhi perceives these developments as a direct challenge to its strategic interests. India is implementing an extensive plan to transform Great Nicobar Island into an advanced center for maritime surveillance, logistical support, and military operations in the eastern Indian Ocean.

India has also strengthened cooperation with Indonesia to develop Sabang port near the northern entrance of the Malacca Strait. This enables India to monitor one of the world’s most vital maritime routes and complements its capabilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

China redraws global electricity maps as container-sized storage banks emerge.

These locations enhance New Delhi’s ability to track global trade flows, secure navigation routes, and bolster its operational presence in the region.

These initiatives coincide with expanding defense cooperation between Indonesia and the United States, Japan, and Australia. This cooperation enhances security infrastructure around the Malacca Strait and the eastern Indian Ocean, complicating the strategic environment in which China operates.

Although these partnerships are not aimed directly at Beijing, they limit the freedom of movement China has long enjoyed in the area.

The report notes that competition between China and India has surpassed traditional naval power concepts, evolving into a struggle over transport networks, supply chains, commercial ports, energy infrastructure, digital communications, and dual-use facilities, which are fundamental pillars of strategic influence in the 21st century.

Accordingly, the proposed corridor linking China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh is not merely a new transport project but a step toward building an integrated logistics network. This network offers Beijing enhanced capacity to maintain trade and energy flows even during crises, reducing dependence on a single route or maritime chokepoint.

India views these moves as threats to the security of its maritime economy. The growing Chinese presence in Myanmar and Bangladesh could affect the security of Indian ports, supply chains, shipping services, and maritime and digital infrastructure, even before this presence evolves into overt military deployment.

China launches its first batch of satellites dedicated to space computing.

The report concludes that the Bay of Bengal is poised to become the main theater of competition between Asia’s two largest powers in the coming years. China bets on constructing a more flexible maritime and logistics network, while India seeks to strengthen regional partnerships and develop naval capabilities to maintain influence in the eastern Indian Ocean.

According to this outlook, the future of this rivalry will be determined not only by naval fleets but also by the ability to secure trade routes, manage supply chains, and build ports and infrastructure, thereby reshaping the strategic map of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian and Pacific Oceans region.