Reviving the 'Proxy Model': Israeli Assessments of Imminent Iranian Escalation from Lebanon

According to a report by the Hebrew newspaper Maariv, the new reality in the Strait of Hormuz may push Iran to seek new methods of pressure on the United States, and under this scenario, Hezbollah could once again become a key instrument for it.

The report cites Eyal Ofir, an Israeli researcher and expert on Hamas and the Gaza Strip economy, analyzing the situation on the Iranian front following recent U.S. sanctions and pressures on Tehran.

According to Ofir, the most significant change for Tehran lies in the maritime domain. He claims that Iran is currently facing difficulties exporting goods and importing products into its territory via the Strait of Hormuz.

He adds that this situation is worsening with the announcement by U.S. Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper about opening the Strait of Hormuz to free navigation.

Ofir sees this as a fundamental shift in the equation. He says: "The sands of time have turned": whereas Iran previously used the threat to the Strait of Hormuz as leverage, the current momentum works against it, and continued blockade could intensify economic and strategic pressure on Tehran.

According to Ofir, under pressure, Iran tends to deliberately escalate across various domains to increase pressure on regional actors, then use the new situation as leverage in negotiations.

As he notes, the goal is not necessarily reaching a quick agreement, but forcing Tehran into a prolonged and exhausting process aimed at improving its negotiating position.

He adds: "Iran’s method of exiting crises has always been and will remain creating further escalation in the region." He believes Tehran’s leadership understands that to reach the negotiation table from a stronger position, it must first re-escalate pressure levels.

Hezbollah at the Center of the Stage

According to Ofir’s analysis, the main arena through which Iran might seek to achieve this is Lebanon.

He argues that Iran’s stance toward Hezbollah fundamentally differs from its stance toward Hamas. While Hamas is considered a disposable card, Hezbollah, from Tehran’s perspective, is an inseparable part of Iran’s regional power structure, and thus Iran will work to preserve it.

Ofir believes that arrangements between Israel and Lebanon are undermining the proxy model Iran has built over years, and therefore Iran may attempt to undermine it through Hezbollah’s activities in southern Lebanon.

Under the scenario he outlines, the goal is not necessarily launching a large-scale attack on Israel’s internal front, but rather Hezbollah attempting to strike Israeli Defense Forces units in areas where they can still operate, in a way designed to provoke an Israeli response.

Ofir believes such steps may be planned so that the Israeli response becomes the focus of international attention. According to him, if Hezbollah succeeds in harming IDF soldiers and Israel responds forcefully, Tehran may try to construct a narrative claiming Israel initiated the escalation.

From his perspective, this is a crucial element of the scenario: creating a chain of events where limited Hezbollah activity leads to an Israeli response, which is then used to justify further escalation by Iran or its proxies.

Ofir also estimates these attempts could be carried out during sensitive periods, including weekends or official holidays, in an effort to maximize the impact of strikes against the Israeli Defense Forces.