Houthi Militia Encircles Bab el-Mandeb: The African Coast Becomes New Theater of Operations

The control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait grants the Houthi militia substantial influence over global maritime transport, in addition to impacting regional economies already strained by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as tensions and conflicts in the region now threaten to extend into the Horn of Africa.

For years, the Houthis in Yemen, backed by Iran, have been building a network of allies, recruits, and logistical hubs across several African countries bordering the Red Sea. This strategic location enabled their takeover of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Friday, September 11.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait separates Asia from Africa, serving as a vital artery for global trade, the world’s fourth-largest energy corridor, and a refuge for shipping since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The Houthis are now positioned just 20 kilometers from the African coast. Seizing the city of al-Mukha and the island of Muyn allows the militia to strengthen its grip over the Yemeni coastline, with significant implications for the African coast, where the western shore of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait belongs to Djibouti and Eritrea.

This military escalation has forced more than 2,000 people from Yemen to flee to the city of Obock in Djibouti, and the United Nations has warned that such displacement could increase as fighting intensifies. Djiboutian Finance Minister Elias Doualeh stated that the situation is "becoming increasingly difficult" for his country.

Economic Consequences

For other Red Sea-bordering countries, and more broadly for African nations, the consequences of these events may initially be economic.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait lies between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, connecting the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and then to the Suez Canal in Egypt.

According to Business Insider Africa, approximately 12% of global trade passes through this waterway, along with up to 7 million barrels of oil daily—equivalent to 11% of globally transported oil—and 8% of liquefied natural gas.

Disruptions could affect global supply chains, leading to higher transportation, insurance, and fuel costs. All these factors threaten to increase burdens on African nations already weakened by wars in Ukraine and Iran.

On the continental level, East African economies, closely tied to Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean trade, would likely suffer the most from Houthi control of the strait, especially if the maritime corridor slows down or shuts down like the Strait of Hormuz.

For example, Kenya’s Mombasa port might see a noticeable decline in activity if shipping companies reroute and favor South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope route to avoid the Red Sea.

Other ports directly affected include Djibouti’s ports, which serve as a major maritime gateway for neighboring landlocked Ethiopia.

This scenario means Houthi control of the strait could impact African nations not directly bordering the Red Sea.

Even if routes are diverted via Cape Town—adding twenty days to sea voyages—such a scenario entails additional costs that will inevitably be passed on to the price of goods and food, ultimately affecting African consumers.

Djibouti’s Strategic Role

African reports indicate that the Houthi advance poses a major challenge to Djibouti, which hosts U.S., Chinese, Japanese, and French military bases. As a key transit hub for migration from the Sahel region, Djibouti also plays a crucial role in regional security.

Many naval, commercial, and military forces use Djibouti as a logistical stopover, particularly those of the United States and China.

If this crisis worsens, Djibouti will face the challenge of balancing its strategic role in regional security with mounting pressures related to migration and humanitarian aid, which are likely to escalate.

Conversely, Houthi control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait could grant Eritrea, located on the opposite side of the strait, a pivotal geopolitical role.

Eritrea, under President Isaias Afwerki, has leveraged its strategic position on the Red Sea to emerge from international isolation.

Concerningly, relations between the Houthis and other armed groups operating in the Horn of Africa are growing. In late August, Yemen Online revealed that the militia had expanded its smuggling networks beyond Yemen’s borders to include the Horn of Africa.

These networks serve as corridors for weapons, drone components, ballistic missile parts, and maritime technology, enhancing the group’s regional influence. A 2025 UN report even highlights increasing cooperation between the Houthis and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab movement.