Iran's Arms in the African Continent: The Revolutionary Guard Replicates Hezbollah's Experience in Africa

While the Iran-US conflict remains stagnant between cautious calm and tactical escalation aimed at improving negotiation conditions, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is exploiting regional and international preoccupation with Middle Eastern issues to replicate the experiences of Hezbollah and Houthi militias in Africa.

Intelligence sources and field military reports reveal Iranian ambitions to establish military footholds on the African continent through the creation of armed militias loyal to it ideologically and politically.

These sources indicate that while major global powers seek to strengthen their diplomatic, economic, and cultural presence in Africa, Iran is pursuing parallel moves out of the spotlight, led by top-ranking figures from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, particularly the Quds Force responsible for foreign operations.

A Reservoir to Compensate Iranian Losses

Despite tight secrecy surrounding these activities and operations, Western and local African intelligence agencies have uncovered significant expansion of Tehran’s transnational networks across the African continent, bypassing all diplomatic norms and international relations principles.

They added that Tehran has pursued building ideological, field, and logistical influence in Africa for years, aiming to achieve two major objectives: compensating for major losses suffered by Iran and its regional tools following harsh and decisive strikes by Tel Aviv against Hezbollah, the decline of its militias in Iraq, and the loss of the Syrian arena after Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell at the end of 2024.

The second objective lies in using these instruments to secure financial returns or guarantee energy and mining resources abundant in certain African countries—especially after the material and logistical value of rare and precious minerals became evident in electric vehicle manufacturing, mobile computing, smart devices, and artificial intelligence applications.

From Soft Power to Field Penetration

In analyzing Iran’s network of influence in Africa, strategic sources—including the website Dialgo Armacas—indicate that Tehran relies on a three-tiered strategy blending "academic institutions," "media outlets," and "parallel networks."

They add that this three-tiered strategy mirrors the experience of establishing Hezbollah militias in Lebanon, Houthi militias in Yemen, and certain Shia groups in Syria before the fall of the Assad regime.

They emphasize that academic and ideological infiltration has become clearly entrenched at the "International Mahdi University," which serves as the spearhead of this project. It has branches and activities in over 17 African countries—from Senegal and Nigeria to Tanzania and South Africa—and these institutions are used to graduate loyal elites and promote Twelver Shia Imami ideology (the official doctrine of Iran) within local communities.

After securing academic and ideological penetration, the next phase involves establishing armed nuclei, beginning with light and medium weapons, followed by clear arming with heavy and strategic weaponry once "empowerment" is achieved—a model currently applied in West Africa and the Sahel region.

Nigerian "Zakzaky" Movement

At this stage, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, led by Ibrahim "Zakzaky," has emerged as a prototype for Hezbollah-style militias in Lebanon. The movement operates a media network in the local Hausa language, along with the "Hausa TV" channel targeting regional populations.

It exploits the security vacuum left by Western withdrawals from the West African Sahel (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), alongside the evident weakness of security and military institutions in these countries, and the inability of Russia’s Africa Corps to fill the void left by Western forces.

This is compounded by the fragility of public support for formal armies, documented in UN reports detailing massacres committed by these forces against local populations in those regions.

Following military empowerment, the third phase unfolds through parallel financing and the establishment of logistical networks. Security reports tracking suspicious financial flows reveal a close intersection between Revolutionary Guard activities and the new iteration of Hezbollah militias in West Africa.

Iran exploits diaspora communities and black markets to fund operations via smuggling of goods and capital, along with clear involvement in illicit trade routes.

Sudan and the Red Sea

These reports indicate that the picture is completed by Iran’s expansion from West to East Africa, where Sudan and areas adjacent to the Red Sea represent a vital logistical artery for Tehran, through cooperation with the Sudanese army under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Generally, the Revolutionary Guard, and specifically the Quds Force, view Sudanese territory as a primary gateway for establishing training centers and supply routes for transporting arms and equipment through Port Sudan toward regional flashpoints.

In this context, Tehran heavily relies on Houthi militias to gain strategic leverage, particularly through control of international navigation routes near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.

In conclusion, strategic reports and security assessments monitoring Iran’s influence in Africa suggest that Tehran is exploiting the geopolitical vacuum and declining Western influence in Africa to advance its economic, diplomatic, and security gains.

They argue that this expansion aims not only to break international isolation and sanctions but also to transform parts of the African continent into a rear theater for maneuvering and mutual deterrence messaging against regional and international adversaries.

Al-Arabiya News